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ABSTRACT 
  When a case decided by a lower court becomes moot pending 
appeal, the appellate court must decide whether to vacate that 
decision. This scenario may arise in litigation spurred by opposition 
to an outgoing presidential administration’s midnight regulations—
rules hurriedly promulgated during the president’s last days in office. 
An incoming president may change an unfinished midnight rule 
pending appeal of a decision invalidating that rule, thereby mooting 
the case. Faced with this posture in a case against the United States 
Department of Agriculture (USDA), the Tenth Circuit vacated as 
moot the lower court’s decision invalidating a Forest Service rule, 
despite unclear vacatur-for-mootness case law that questions whether 
vacatur is appropriate when a rule change causes mootness. 
  This Note argues that the Tenth Circuit’s approach was correct and 
should be followed in midnight-regulation cases. Although this Note 
does not argue that rule changes per se warrant vacatur, midnight-
regulation research shows that the motives surrounding the practice 
are not related to litigation, but rather to political differences between 
incoming and outgoing administrations. Moreover, the Supreme 
Court’s decision in FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc. hints that 
courts should not scrutinize government motives for rule changes and 
that political reasons are appropriate justifications for changing rules. 
Because motive is critical to vacatur analysis, cases involving 
midappeal midnight-rule-change mootness should be vacated. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Presidential administrations often speedily promulgate several 
last rules before a new president—particularly one from a different 
political party—takes office. Administrative-law scholars and the 
media have termed this practice midnight regulation.1 Midnight-
regulation scholarship posits that the motives surrounding the 
practice are largely political,2 and recent incoming presidents have 
confronted the practice by suspending unfinished midnight rules upon 
taking office for similar political reasons.3 Controversial midnight 
regulations may also irk private parties, who often sue the outgoing 
administration in federal court over the validity of its midnight rules, 
even before the new president takes office.4 When the president 
finally does take office, the new administration becomes the 
defendant in these lawsuits, though often in name only. That is, the 
incoming administration may find itself in court defending rules that 
it wants to change.5 
Adding insult to injury, an incoming administration might face a 
separate legal challenge if it decides to change the rule and undo6 its 
predecessor’s midnight rulemaking.7 Longstanding Supreme Court 
 
 1. See, e.g., Jerry Brito & Veronique de Rugy, Midnight Regulations & Regulatory Review, 
61 ADMIN. L. REV. 163, 163–64 (2009) (“[M]idnight regulation[] describes the dramatic spike of 
new regulations promulgated at the end of presidential terms, especially during transitions to an 
administration of the opposite party.”); John M. Broder, A Legacy Bush Can Control, N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 9, 2007, § 4 (Week in Review), at 1 (“Every president comes into office 
complaining about the . . . midnight regulations left on the White House doorstep by his 
predecessor.”); see also infra Part III. 
 2. See, e.g., Andrew P. Morriss, Roger E. Meiners & Andrew Dorchak, Between a Hard 
Rock and a Hard Place: Politics, Midnight Regulations and Mining, 55 ADMIN. L. REV. 551, 588 
(2003) (“Midnight regulations are an important political weapon.”); see also Broder, supra note 
1 (describing midnight regulation as “a way for an administration to have life after death” 
(quoting Philip Clapp, President, National Environmental Trust)); infra Part III.A. 
 3. See infra Part III.B. 
 4. See infra Part III.C. 
 5. See, e.g., Nina A. Mendelson, Agency Burrowing: Entrenching Policies and Personnel 
Before a New President Arrives, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 557, 624 (2003) (“After the State of Idaho 
had filed litigation challenging [a Clinton-era midnight] rule . . . the Bush administration 
indicated that it would not be defending the rule on the merits.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 6. Changing or rescinding midnight rules posttransition is frequently described as 
“undoing” midnight regulations. See, e.g., REECE RUSHING, RICK MELBERTH & MATT MADIA, 
CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS & OMB WATCH, AFTER MIDNIGHT: THE BUSH LEGACY OF 
DEREGULATION AND WHAT OBAMA CAN DO 6 (2009), available at http://www.american 
progress.org/issues/2009/01/pdf/midnight_regulations.pdf (listing “[o]ptions for blocking and 
undoing midnight regulations”). 
 7. See infra Part III.C. 
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administrative law doctrine made posttransition rule changes difficult 
to defend if challenged in court,8 and at least one president avoided 
changing his predecessor’s midnight rules for fear that he could not 
justify the modifications to a court’s satisfaction.9 In a recent decision, 
however, the Supreme Court relaxed scrutiny of the reasons that may 
legitimately support an agency’s decision to change policy.10 This 
decision supports postinauguration rule changes; incoming 
administrations will more readily change unfinished midnight rules 
upon taking office without fear of stiff judicial scrutiny of their 
motives.11 
This development leaves an open question: procedurally, what 
should happen if a plaintiff successfully challenges a midnight rule in 
a district court but, pending appeal, a new administration changes the 
disputed rule, thus mooting the case?12 In Wyoming v. USDA 
(Wyoming II),13 a rare court of appeals decision presenting this 
situation,14 the Tenth Circuit vacated as moot15 the district court’s 
 
 8. See infra Part III.C.2. 
 9. See Jason M. Loring & Liam R. Roth, Empirical Study, After Midnight: The Durability 
of the “Midnight” Regulations Passed by the Two Previous Outgoing Administrations, 40 WAKE 
FOREST L. REV. 1441, 1441 (2005) (noting President George W. Bush’s “reluctance to amend or 
repeal midnight regulations” because of rule-change doctrine). 
 10. The case, FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1800 (2009), and the Court’s 
position on agency policy change are discussed in Part III.C.2, infra. 
 11. For further discussion of incoming presidents’ responses to unfinished midnight rules, 
see infra Part III.B, and for further discussion of judicial review of these responses, see infra 
Part III.C. 
 12. Cf. 13C CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER, 
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3533.10 (3d ed. 2008) (“Distinctive questions arise 
when a case becomes moot after decision by the trial court. . . . The proper course to follow 
after determining that the case is moot and must not be decided on the merits, however, 
is . . . complicated.”). 
 13. Wyoming v. USDA (Wyoming II), 414 F.3d 1207 (10th Cir. 2005). 
 14. Although other courts have analyzed vacatur in cases involving mootness from rule 
changes, e.g., Tafas v. Kappos 586 F.3d 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (en banc), and policy changes, e.g., 
19 Solid Waste Dep’t Mechs. v. City of Albuquerque, 76 F.3d 1142 (10th Cir. 1996), Wyoming II 
is one of (if not the) only court of appeals cases that addressed a change to a midnight rule. 
 15. See, e.g., Elizabeth Rand, Recent Decision, The D.C. Circuit Review, August 1996–July 
1997—Civil Procedure: Diluting the Presumption Against Vacatur, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 789, 
790–91 (1998) (“Once a court determines that a judgment is moot, it may not consider its merits, 
but may dispose of the case as justice may require. A court examines the nature and character of 
the conditions which have caused the case to become moot in deciding whether to vacate the 
lower court’s decision.” (footnotes and internal quotations omitted)). The Supreme Court has 
noted that vacatur is an “extraordinary remedy.” U.S. Bancorp Mortg. Co. v. Bonner Mall 
P’ship, 513 U.S. 18, 26 (1994). 
  An appellate court may either vacate as moot directly or remand to the district court 
with instructions to consider whether vacatur is appropriate. Bonner Mall, 513 U.S. at 29. This 
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ruling striking down a U.S. Forest Service regulation banning forest 
road construction (Wyoming I).16 It is unclear that such a course is 
proper: the Supreme Court has never confronted the problem, there 
exists little other precedent for the scenario, several courts of appeals 
have indicated that they might have decided the issue differently, and 
the Federal Circuit actually did so in another case involving mootness 
caused by a rule change.17 This Note, however, argues that the Tenth 
Circuit’s analysis was correct and should be applied in similar cases. 
Vacatur is the appropriate remedy for midnight-rulemaking cases 
mooted when an incoming administration changes a challenged 
regulation pending appeal. 
Part I of this Note introduces the Tenth Circuit’s decision to 
vacate as moot the lower court’s decision on a midnight rule’s 
validity. Part II discusses vacatur-for-mootness doctrine, including the 
debate over the vacatur remedy, Supreme Court precedent, and 
vacatur analysis in the lower courts. Part III introduces midnight 
rulemaking, laying out the controversy surrounding the practice, 
motives for regulating at midnight, and reasons that an incoming 
president would want to change his predecessor’s unfinished midnight 
rules. Part III also explains the main tools used to respond to 
midnight rules—postinauguration rule suspensions and litigation—
and discusses the standards courts apply when reviewing the undoing 
of midnight rules in such litigation. In particular, it discusses these 
standards in light of the Supreme Court’s 2009 decision in FCC v. Fox 
Television Stations, Inc.18 Finally, Part IV examines the Tenth 
Circuit’s vacatur analysis in light of the ambiguous case law on the 
subject and the midnight-rulemaking observations made in Part III. 
This Note concludes that the Tenth Circuit’s approach was correct, 
that it should be followed in similar cases, and that it might guide how 
scholars and courts view midnight rulemaking and rule-change 
mootness. 
I.  THE TENTH CIRCUIT AND THE ROADLESS RULE 
The ongoing battle over the U.S. Forest Service’s 2001 “roadless 
rule,” which prohibited road development in large swaths of National 
 
Note uses these options interchangeably. 
 16. Wyoming II, 414 F.3d at 1214, vacating as moot 277 F. Supp. 2d 1197 (D. Wyo. 2003); 
see also infra Part I.B. 
 17. See infra Part II.B. 
 18. FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1800 (2009). 
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Forest land,19 exemplifies judicial involvement with midnight 
rulemaking. Promulgated during the Clinton administration’s last 
days, the regulation spurred controversy that has spanned several 
presidential administrations and lingered in courts for nearly a 
decade.20 Almost immediately, courts questioned the rule’s 
controversial promulgation. Indeed, the district court judge in 
Wyoming v. USDA (Wyoming I)21 noted that “the United States 
Forest Service drove through the administrative process in a vehicle 
smelling of political prestidigitation.”22 The roadless-rule litigation is 
particularly important because the Bush administration rescinded the 
roadless rule while the Wyoming I decision invalidating it was on 
appeal, thereby mooting the case.23 This Part explains the roadless 
rule’s controversial promulgation, discusses the effect of President 
Bush’s postinauguration rule change on the litigation, and introduces 
the Tenth Circuit’s vacatur decision in Wyoming II. 
A.  Roadless Rule Background 
Although branded as a midnight regulation,24 the roadless rule’s 
history predates President Clinton’s waning term in office.25 When 
Congress created the Forest Service in 1897, it gave forest 
 
 19. Special Areas; Roadless Area Conservation, 66 Fed. Reg. 3244, 3272–73 (Jan. 12, 2001) 
(codified as amended at 36 C.F.R. pt. 294 (2009)); see also Mendelson, supra note 5, at 619–20 
(explaining the roadless rule’s novelty and interest). See generally Martin Nie, Administrative 
Rulemaking and Public Lands Conflict: The Forest Service’s Roadless Rule, 44 NAT. 
RESOURCES J. 687, 696–714 (2004) (providing a history of the roadless rule). 
 20. CURTIS W. COPELAND, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40777, “MIDNIGHT RULES” 
ISSUED NEAR THE END OF THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION: A STATUS REPORT 27 (2009). 
 21. Wyoming v. USDA (Wyoming I), 277 F. Supp. 2d 1197 (D. Wyo. 2003), vacated as 
moot, 414 F.3d 1207 (10th Cir. 2005). 
 22. Id. at 1203. 
 23. See Wyoming v. USDA (Wyoming II), 414 F.3d 1207, 1211 (10th Cir. 2005) (“Oral 
argument was held on May 4, 2005, and the next day the Forest Service announced the adoption 
of a final rule replacing the Roadless Rule. . . . [T]he new [State Petitions for Inventoried 
Roadless Area Management] rule moots this case . . . .”); see also Anne Joseph O’Connell, 
Political Cycles of Rulemaking: An Empirical Portrait of the Modern Administrative State, 94 
VA. L. REV. 889, 905 n.50 (2008) (“The [Tenth Circuit] case was mooted when the USDA, 
under President Bush, rescinded the [roadless] rule.”). 
 24. E.g., Susan E. Dudley, The Bush Administration Regulatory Record, REGULATION, 
Winter 2004–2005, at 4, 5, available at http://www.cato.org/pubs/regulation/regv27n4/v27n4- 
mercreport.pdf (calling the roadless rule a “prominent Clinton midnight regulation”); Ben 
Lieberman, Opinion, Midnight Madness—Washington Style, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Jan. 10, 
2001, at B7 (listing the roadless rule among midnight regulations). 
 25. See Mendelson, supra note 5, at 619–27 (providing a history of the roadless rule); Nie, 
supra note 19, at 696–714 (same). 
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administrators the power to protect public forests from 
environmental damage.26 In 1924, the Forest Service created the first 
of several “wilderness preserves”—“primitive” areas undisturbed by 
roads and similar improvements.27 Congress later codified this 
process, directing the Forest Service to analyze federal lands that 
could qualify as roadless wilderness areas under the Wilderness Act.28 
Between 1977 and 1979, the Forest Service flagged approximately 62 
million National Forest acres as potential roadless wilderness.29 
Although the Forest Service abandoned its land-analysis 
programs after unfavorable court rulings, the Clinton administration 
resurrected Forest Service wilderness area identification.30 In 1999 the 
Forest Service suspended road construction activities in inventoried 
roadless areas while it developed a new road management policy.31 
An “Interim Roadless Rule” took effect on March 1, 1999, imposing 
an eighteen-month road-construction moratorium in inventoried 
roadless areas.32 In October 1999, President Clinton directed the 
Forest Service to issue a final rule no later than the fall of 2000.33 This 
directive’s timing was problematic: 
The Forest Service recognized that if it were to issue the final rule 
by December 2000, it would have to require a very short 
timeframe . . . for the public to respond to [the Notice of Intent]. As 
a result, the Roadless Rule [Notice of Intent] provided for a sixty-
day comment period, which expired on December 20, 1999.34 
 
 26. Act of June 4, 1897, ch. 2, 30 Stat. 11, 35 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 473–478, 
479–482, 551 (2006)) (“The Secretary of the Interior shall make provisions for the protection 
against destruction by fire and depredations upon the public forests and forest 
reservations . . . .”). 
 27. H. Michael Anderson & Aliki Moncrief, America’s Unprotected Wilderness, 76 DENV. 
U. L. REV. 413, 434 (1999). 
 28. Wilderness Act, Pub. L. No. 88-577, 78 Stat. 890 (1964) (codified as amended at 16 
U.S.C. §§ 1131–1136 (2006)); id. § 3(b), 78 Stat. at 891 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 
1132); see also Nie, supra note 19, at 698 (“The Wilderness Act included a congressional 
mandate that the FS [Forest Service] inventory its land for possible wilderness designation.”). 
 29. Wyoming v. USDA (Wyoming I), 277 F. Supp. 2d 1197, 1205 (D. Wyo. 2003), vacated 
as moot, 414 F.3d 1207 (10th Cir. 2005). 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. (citing Administration of the Forest Development Transportation System: 
Temporary Suspension of Road Construction and Reconstruction in Unroaded Areas, 64 Fed. 
Reg. 7290, 7304–05 (Feb. 12, 1999) (codified at 36 C.F.R. § 212.13 (2000))). 
 33. Id. at 1206. 
 34. Id. (first and second alterations in original) (citations omitted) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
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After the Notice of Intent comment period expired, the Forest 
Service proceeded on an expedited timeframe despite calls from 
several states to extend it.35 Although commenters decried the Forest 
Service’s subsequent Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) 
comment procedure as a “sham” and “simply going through 
the . . . motions to reach a predetermined outcome,” the Forest 
Service refused to extend the EIS comment period, which closed in 
July 2000.36 The final roadless rule was published on January 12, 2001, 
and prohibited road construction in inventoried roadless areas.37 As 
one court later noted, “this vast national forest acreage, for better or 
worse, was more committed to pristine wilderness, and less amenable 
to road development.”38 
Almost immediately after the roadless rule was finalized in 
January 2001, Wyoming challenged it in a Wyoming district court,39 
alleging numerous procedural violations in the rule’s promulgation.40 
The district court agreed and issued a permanent injunction against 
its enforcement.41 Although the government acquiesced in the 
decision, the defendant environmental groups that intervened in 
support of the rule appealed.42 
But the Tenth Circuit never reviewed the appeal’s merits. Just 
after taking office in 2001, President Bush suspended all rules that 
had not yet taken effect, including the roadless rule.43 Citing 
 
 35. Id. at 1207. 
 36. Id. at 1209. 
 37. Id. at 1210. 
 38. Kootenai Tribe of Idaho v. Veneman (Kootenai Tribe II), 313 F.3d 1094, 1106 (9th Cir. 
2002). 
 39. Wyoming v. USDA (Wyoming II), 414 F.3d 1207, 1211 (10th Cir. 2005); see also 
Wyoming I, 277 F. Supp. 2d at 1203 (describing the Wyoming suit); Kootenai Tribe of Idaho v. 
Veneman (Kootenai Tribe I), No. CV01-10-N-EJL, 2001 WL 1141275, at *1 (D. Idaho May 10, 
2001), rev’d, 313 F.3d 1094 (9th Cir. 2002) (describing a similar challenge to the rule in the 
District of Idaho). 
 40. Wyoming I, 277 F. Supp. 2d at 1203–04. 
 41. Wyoming I, 277 F. Supp. 2d at 1239. 
 42. Wyoming II, 414 F.3d at 1210. Interestingly, “[a] number of environmental 
organizations intervened on behalf of the federal defendants in defense of the Rule.” Id.; see 
also Nie, supra note 19, at 706 (“[T]he new administration chose not to defend the rule in 
court . . . . [But] the Ninth Circuit granted intervenor status to several environmental groups.”). 
 43. Kootenai Tribe II, 313 F.3d at 1106 (“On January 20, 2001, newly-inaugurated 
President George Walker Bush issued an order postponing by sixty days the effective date of all 
the prior administration’s regulations and rules not yet implemented. The effective date of the 
Roadless Rule was thus postponed until May 12, 2001.”); see also Memorandum for the Heads 
and Acting Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies, 66 Fed. Reg. 7702, 7702 (Jan. 24, 
2001) (directing executive departments and agencies to temporarily postpone the effective dates 
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“concerns about the process through which the Rule was 
promulgated, the Forest Service [told the district court that it] 
planned to initiate an additional public process that 
[would] . . . examine possible modifications to the Rule.”44 In 2005, 
the reappraisal process ultimately yielded “a final rule replacing the 
Roadless Rule.”45 The Tenth Circuit held that this new rule mooted 
the dispute over the original roadless rule, and the court vacated as 
moot the district court’s ruling in favor of Wyoming.46 
B.  The Tenth Circuit’s Decision to Vacate as Moot 
Before deciding whether to vacate the district court’s decision, 
the Wyoming II court analyzed whether the dispute was actually 
moot. The court noted that its power under Article III of the 
Constitution to hear the appeal turned on whether there was an 
“actual, ongoing case[] or controvers[y]” in the dispute.47 The court 
could not hear the case “if the issues presented [were] no longer 
live.”48 Because the Bush administration had replaced the roadless 
rule pending the appeal, the court held that the new rule 
“eliminat[ed] the issues” in the case and “rendered the appeal 
moot.”49 Not only did the challenged portions of the roadless rule “no 
longer exist” under the new rule, but the roadless rule’s “alleged 
procedural deficiencies” were also “irrelevant because the 
replacement rule was promulgated in a new and separate rulemaking 
process.”50 
The appellants argued that the case was not moot because the 
roadless rule could later be reinstated or, alternatively, that the Forest 
 
of published regulations not yet implemented); William M. Jack, Comment, Taking Care that 
Presidential Oversight of the Regulatory Process Is Faithfully Executed: A Review of Rule 
Withdrawals and Rule Suspensions Under the Bush Administration’s Card Memorandum, 54 
ADMIN. L. REV. 1479, 1480 (2002) (“On January 20, 2001, Andrew H. Card, Jr., Assistant to the 
President and Chief of Staff, issued a memorandum . . . temporarily postpon[ing] the effective 
dates of published regulations not yet in effect.”). 
 44. Kootenai Tribe II, 313 F.3d at 1106 (second alteration in original) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
 45. Wyoming II, 414 F.3d at 1211. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. (quoting Lewis v. Cont’l Bank Corp., 494 U.S. 472, 477 (1990)). 
 48. Id. (quoting City of Erie v. Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 287 (2000)) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
 49. Id. at 1212. 
 50. Id. 
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Service had “strategically manipulated the courts.”51 The court, 
however, rejected these contentions, in part because the roadless 
rule’s opponents could bring another suit if it were reinstated.52 
Contrary to the appellants’ suggestion, the court also observed that 
the government changed its rule not because of the district court’s 
judgment, but because the government believed that the roadless rule 
merited revision.53 Holding that the appeal was moot, the court turned 
to whether the district court’s judgment should be vacated.54 
In its vacatur analysis,55 the court focused on the reason for the 
mootness. The court observed that vacatur for mootness is 
appropriate “when mootness results from happenstance or the actions 
of the prevailing party.”56 The reason for this “general practice” of 
vacatur, the court noted, is that the appellant would otherwise 
unfairly lose his right to appeal an adverse judgment.57 Vacatur, 
however, “is generally not appropriate when mootness is a result of a 
voluntary act of a nonprevailing party.”58 
As an equitable remedy, the court observed that “[v]acatur . . . is 
determined by the particular circumstances of each case.”59 The court 
first noted that the USDA had not appealed the ruling against the 
roadless rule:60 “[B]ecause the party seeking appellate relief is not the 
party responsible for mooting the case, the orderly operation of the 
appellate system is not being frustrated.”61 That is, none of the facts 
indicated that the USDA had repealed the regulation to manipulate 
or “undermine the district court’s ruling.”62 As the court observed, 
“the replacement of the Roadless Rule was not triggered by the 
 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. (“If the Roadless Rule were to reappear in the future, there would be ample 
opportunity to challenge the rule before it ceased to exist.”). 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. at 1212–13. 
 55. For a discussion of the vacatur-for-mootness doctrine and the inquiry courts make in 
deciding whether to vacate, see infra Part II. 
 56. Wyoming II, 414 F.3d at 1213. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. at 1213 n.6. 
 60. Id. at 1213; see also Aaron S. Bayer, Vacatur for Mootness, NAT’L L.J., Mar. 20, 2006, at 
15 (“The court reasoned that since the Forest Service was not appealing the adverse decision 
(intervening environmental groups had filed the appeal), there was no manipulation of the 
judicial process and vacatur was appropriate.”). 
 61. Wyoming II, 414 F.3d at 1213. 
 62. Id. at 1213 n.6. 
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district court’s judgment, but merely reflects the government’s 
discontent with the rule itself.”63 The court analogized the 
circumstances of mootness in the roadless rule litigation to mootness 
caused by a legislature repealing a disputed statute.64 Thus, the Tenth 
Circuit vacated the district court’s judgment. 
The Wyoming II court recognized the controversy of its holding, 
though. Although the court ultimately determined the roadless rule 
case was “more akin to one in which a controversy is mooted through 
‘circumstances unattributable to any of the parties,’”65 the roadless 
rule’s rescission was directly attributable to a litigant’s action—the 
Forest Service’s promulgation of a new rule.66 Moreover, although the 
court compared the rule’s rescission by an agency to a statute’s repeal 
by a legislature, this analogy was ultimately based on analyzing the 
agency’s motives for the rescission in this particular case rather than 
on evaluating agency rule changes generally.67 In a footnote, the 
Wyoming II court noted that, in the very case to which it had 
analogized, the D.C. Circuit had indicated that it may not have 
vacated if the mootness had been caused by agency action.68 
Nevertheless, because the Forest Service had not attempted to “avoid 
or undermine the district court’s ruling,” the Wyoming II court 
determined that “[a]ny unfairness that may generally result from 
vacating a lower court’s judgment when the losing party moots a case 
[was] not present.”69 
Although the roadless-rule litigation exemplifies only one option 
for when a postinauguration midnight-rule change moots a case 
midappeal, the rarity of such cases makes it an important example.70 
Because of its rarity, the Tenth Circuit’s vacatur analysis could guide 
future decisions in similar cases. But the Tenth Circuit’s approach 
should be avoided if that court reached the wrong conclusion—a valid 
 
 63. Id. at 1212. 
 64. Id. at 1213 (comparing the roadless rule’s replacement to the mootness caused by 
legislative enactment in National Black Police Ass’n v. District of Columbia, 108 F.3d 346 (D.C. 
Cir. 1997)). 
 65. Id. (quoting U.S. Bancorp Mortg. Co. v. Bonner Mall P’ship, 513 U.S. 18, 23 (1994)). 
 66. See supra text accompanying notes 49–54. 
 67. See Wyoming II, 414 F.3d at 1213 (“This is . . . not a case in which a litigant is 
attempting to manipulate the courts . . . .”). 
 68. Id. at 1213 n.6 (citing Nat’l Black Police Ass’n, 108 F.3d at 353). 
 69. Id. 
 70. See supra note 14 and accompanying text. 
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concern in light of unsettled case law on the subject.71 Though this 
Note ultimately concludes that the Tenth Circuit’s analysis was 
correct,72 the following Part explores the broader doctrinal 
controversy surrounding vacatur for mootness. 
II.  VACATUR-FOR-MOOTNESS DOCTRINE AND MIDAPPEAL  
RULE CHANGES 
In Wyoming II, the Tenth Circuit decided in favor of vacatur, but 
it acknowledged the legal uncertainty on the issue.73 This Part 
examines the legal background of vacatur-for-mootness doctrine, 
discussing the controversy behind a court’s decision to vacate, current 
Supreme Court case law, and vacatur analyses in the lower courts 
when law change has caused mootness. 
A.  An Introduction to Vacatur as a Remedy for Mootness 
Determining whether to vacate a lower court decision for 
mootness starts from the fairly uncontroversial position that Article 
III of the Constitution requires an actual “case or controversy” 
through each litigation phase. Although a controversy may have 
existed when a district court issued an opinion, a change of 
circumstances may have resolved it. At that point, a case is moot, and 
an appellate court must dismiss the appeal.74 But if it does, it must 
then decide what to do with the lower court opinion. Essentially, the 
opinion can either remain good law or be vacated. 
This question bears significant consequences. If the appellate 
court vacates the decision, the decision will lose legal force75 and 
precedential value.76 This decision can affect the prevailing litigant in 
 
 71. See infra Part II.B–C. 
 72. See infra Part IV. 
 73. Wyoming II, 414 F.3d at 1213 & n.6. 
 74. See, e.g., Lewis v. Cont’l Bank Corp., 494 U.S. 472, 477–78 (1990) (“[Article III’s] case-
or-controversy requirement subsists through all stages of federal judicial proceedings, trial and 
appellate. To sustain our jurisdiction in the present case, it is not enough that a dispute was  
very much alive when suit was filed, or when review was obtained in the Court of Appeals.”); 
see also U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 (“The judicial Power shall extend to . . . Cases . . . [and] 
Controversies . . . .”). 
 75. See generally Jill E. Fisch, Rewriting History: The Propriety of Eradicating Prior 
Decisional Law Through Settlement and Vacatur, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 589, 606–32 (1991) 
(detailing the effect of vacatur on judgments). 
 76. See id. at 630 (“Although a vacated decision may remain in the case reporters, its 
precedential value is extremely limited.” (footnote omitted)). For more information on court 
rules against the citation of vacated, depublished, and unpublished opinions, see generally 
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the action below in other ways. For example, if the lower court’s 
opinion is vacated, the litigant will be unable to recover legal fees to 
which he is entitled by statute as the prevailing party77—a party 
cannot prevail in a judgment that no longer exists. 
Loss of a vacated judgment’s precedential effect can also have 
repercussions beyond those involved in the initial litigation. When a 
lower court has decided an issue in one case, the nonmutual collateral 
estoppel doctrine gives that decision preclusive effect if another 
litigant sues on the same issue.78 In other words, the court hearing the 
new litigation would dismiss the issue as having already been 
adjudicated.79 If the lower court’s judgment is vacated by an appellate 
court, however, future litigants lose the ability to assert nonmutual 
collateral estoppel, and the next court must decide the issue again.80 
This scenario affects mostly private parties, though, because litigants 
typically cannot assert nonmutual collateral estoppel against the 
government.81 
 
Stephen R. Barnett, No-Citation Rules Under Siege: A Battlefield Report and Analysis, 5 J. APP. 
PRAC. & PROCESS 473 (2003). 
 77. Certain statutes, like 42 U.S.C. § 1988, abrogate the common law and allow prevailing 
parties to recover attorneys’ fees from party opponents: 
In any action or proceeding to enforce a provision of sections 1981, 1981a, 1982, 1983, 
1985, and 1986 of this title, title IX of Public Law 92-318 [20 U.S.C. 1681 et seq.], the 
Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 [42 U.S.C. 2000bb et seq.], the Religious 
Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 [42 U.S.C. 2000cc et seq.], title VI 
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 [42 U.S.C. 2000d et seq.], or section 13981 of this title, 
the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United 
States, a reasonable attorney’s fee . . . . 
42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) (2006) (alterations in original). Vacatur for mootness pending appeal strips 
parties of prevailing party status for § 1988 purposes. Lewis, 494 U.S. at 480; see also Appellee 
Triantafyllos Tafas’ Reply to Motion for Dismissal of Appeal & Request for Remand at 5–6, 
Tafas v. Kappos, 586 F.3d 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (en banc) (No. 2008-1352) (“[E]ntitlement 
to . . . fees is dependent upon a threshold showing that Tafas is a prevailing party. Tafas should 
not be precluded by vacatur from recovering his attorneys fees despite prevailing at the district 
court . . . .” (footnote omitted) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (2006))). 
 78. See RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., JOHN F. MANNING, DANIEL J. MELTZER & DAVID L. 
SHAPIRO, HART AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 1311–
12 (6th ed. 2009) (explaining nonmutual collateral estoppel). 
 79. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27 (1982) (“When an issue of fact or 
law is actually litigated and determined by a valid and final judgment . . . the determination is 
conclusive in a subsequent action between the parties, whether on the same or a different 
claim.”). 
 80. See, e.g., Gould v. Control Laser Corp., 866 F.2d 1391, 1395 n.6 (11th Cir. 1989) 
(“Vacating the consent judgment would preclude a collateral estoppel defense in a later case 
and decide the issue before it arises.”). 
 81. See, e.g., Standefer v. United States, 447 U.S. 10, 25 (1980) (denying preclusion under 
nonmutual collateral estoppel against the government in a criminal prosecution). A party who 
prevailed against the government may still oppose vacatur for other reasons, such as the desire 
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Precedential value and issue preclusion are public values of 
judgments. Vacating judgments thus bears a public cost.82 Indeed, 
scholars often cite the loss of public value as a reason that courts 
should not vacate opinions.83 Thus, when deciding to vacate a 
judgment, courts must weigh the equities of preserving the judgment’s 
public value against the reasons supporting vacatur.84 
Because vacatur carries such serious consequences, courts 
scrutinize the underlying reason for mootness, particularly when a 
party’s action has rendered the decision moot. The main concern is 
that a litigant, faced with unfavorable precedent in a lower court’s 
opinion, will attempt to moot the case on appeal to eliminate the 
judgment’s effect.85 The issue is particularly critical for parties who 
know they will routinely litigate the same issue in other courts in the 
future.86 On the other hand, involuntarily forfeiting one’s right to 
appeal, due to uncontrollable circumstances, would be inherently 
inequitable. This consideration tips the balance toward vacatur under 
such circumstances—it would be inequitable not to vacate.87 Thus, 
 
to recover fees as the prevailing party. See supra note 77 and accompanying text. 
  That nonmutual collateral estoppel does not apply against the government ties in to the 
concept of agency nonacquiescence—an agency’s refusal to follow precedent against it. See 
generally Samuel Estreicher & Richard L. Revesz, Nonacquiescence by Federal Administrative 
Agencies, 98 YALE L.J. 679 (1989) (discussing agency nonacquiescence). For present purposes, 
agencies may have even less incentive to avoid negative precedent by manipulatively changing 
rules to prompt vacatur because agencies can simply nonacquiesce in the judgments against 
them. See infra text accompanying notes 256–59. 
 82. See, e.g., Fisch, supra note 75, at 641 (listing “forgoing the collateral estoppel and res 
judicata effects of the prior judgment,” “the erasure of collateral consequences of an adverse 
judgment, the loss of precedential value for judicial decisions, and a diminished respect for the 
judicial process” among the “social costs” of vacatur); see also Judith Resnik, Whose Judgment? 
Vacating Judgments, Preferences for Settlement, and the Role of Adjudication at the Close of the 
Twentieth Century, 41 UCLA L. REV. 1471, 1526–32 (1994) (surveying some of the oft-cited 
public values of judgments). 
 83. See, e.g., Fisch, supra note 75, at 641–42 (arguing against vacatur in cases in which 
settlement moots the dispute because of the public cost of vacatur). 
 84. See, e.g., Ringsby Truck Lines, Inc. v. W. Conf. of Teamsters, 686 F.2d 720, 722 (9th Cir. 
1982) (explaining that the decision to vacate “may be different in different cases as equities and 
hardships vary the balance between the competing values of right to relitigate and finality of 
judgment”). 
 85. See, e.g., FALLON ET AL., supra note 78, at 193 (identifying the concern that vacatur for 
mootness could “let[] repeat players ‘buy up’ judgments that they dislike by settling cases 
pending on appeal and seeking vacatur”). 
 86. Id.; see also Jill E. Fisch, The Vanishing Precedent: Eduardo Meets Vacatur, 70 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 325, 335 (1994) (“[V]acatur seems like a type of precedential hide and 
seek . . . . Allowing routine vacatur also seems inconsistent with the broader structure of 
adjudicative lawmaking.” (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 87. See U.S. Bancorp Mortg. Co. v. Bonner Mall P’ship, 513 U.S. 18, 24–25 (1994) (stating 
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although vacatur is described as an “extraordinary” remedy88 to be 
granted only when the “balance of the equities” favors vacatur,89 the 
parties’ motives and the reasons for mootness guide which weights a 
court selects for its scale. 
B.  Supreme Court Case Law on Vacatur for Mootness 
The Supreme Court’s vacatur-for-mootness jurisprudence is 
largely confined to two cases: United States v. Munsingwear, Inc.90 and 
U.S. Bancorp Mortgage Co. v. Bonner Mall Partnership.91 These cases’ 
central principle is that “[w]hen a case in a federal system becomes 
moot on appeal, the disposition depends on the nature of the events 
that mooted the dispute.”92 
The dispute in Munsingwear involved a regulatory price-fixing 
claim against Munsingwear. The United States unsuccessfully 
prosecuted the claim in district court and appealed the case. With the 
appeal pending, however, the commodity whose price Munsingwear 
had allegedly manipulated was deregulated.93 Although the United 
States was a litigant, the Court considered the deregulation 
“happenstance” and suggested, in dicta, that vacatur was necessary to 
“clear[] the path for future relitigation of the issues between the 
parties.”94 Today, Munsingwear’s holding is considered to mean that 
[v]acatur is generally appropriate when a case becomes moot 
because of “happenstance” or developments unrelated to the 
litigation, or when the appellee’s actions moot the case, on the 
theory that the winner below should not be able to manipulate the 
judicial process to insulate its victory from appellate review.95 
Although the case did not address whether regulatory activity that 
causes mootness—such as deregulation—is generally an appropriate 
 
that “[a] party who seeks review of the merits of an adverse ruling, but is frustrated by the 
vagaries of circumstance, ought not in fairness be forced to acquiesce in the judgment” under 
the “equitable tradition of vacatur”). 
 88. Id. at 26. 
 89. E.g., Hyundai Merch. Marine Co. Ltd. v. Oceanic Petrol. Source PTE, 656 F. Supp. 2d 
416, 420 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (“[T]he Court finds that the balance of the equities weighs against 
vacatur.”); accord Bonner Mall, 513 U.S. at 26. 
 90. United States v. Munsingwear, Inc., 340 U.S. 36 (1950). 
 91. U.S. Bancorp Mortg. Co. v. Bonner Mall P’ship, 513 U.S. 18 (1994). 
 92. FALLON ET AL., supra note 78, at 192. 
 93. Munsingwear, 340 U.S. at 37. 
 94. Id. at 39–40. 
 95. Bayer, supra note 60. 
CUENIN IN PRINTER PROOF 10/17/2010  10:28:22 PM 
2010] MOOTING THE NIGHT AWAY 467 
reason for vacatur, Munsingwear remains the leading case on federal 
vacatur in civil cases that have become moot on appeal.96 
Unlike Munsingwear, the Supreme Court’s 1994 Bonner Mall 
decision addressed vacatur when the parties intended to moot the 
case through settlement. The litigants in Bonner Mall settled the case, 
thereby mooting it, and requested vacatur as part of the settlement 
terms.97 Because “[a] party who seeks review of the merits of an 
adverse ruling, but is frustrated by the vagaries of circumstance, ought 
not in fairness be forced to acquiesce in the judgment,” the Bonner 
Mall Court approved of Munsingwear’s “happenstance” dictum in 
favor of vacatur.98 On the other hand, “[w]here mootness results from 
settlement . . . the losing party has voluntarily forfeited his legal 
remedy by the ordinary processes of appeal or certiorari, thereby 
surrendering his claim to the equitable remedy of vacatur.”99 Bonner 
Mall instructs that the primary consideration in a vacatur decision “is 
whether the party seeking relief from the judgment below caused the 
mootness by voluntary action.”100 If so, then the judgment below 
should not be vacated unless the matter presents “extraordinary 
circumstances” that tip the equitable balance in favor of vacatur.101 
That is, the losing party is generally not entitled to vacatur if 
requested as a settlement condition. 
Although it approved of Munsingwear’s holding, the Bonner 
Mall Court questioned, without deciding, whether the Munsingwear 
Court adhered to its own reasoning: 
The suit for injunctive relief in Munsingwear became moot on 
appeal because the regulations sought to be enforced by the United 
States were annulled by Executive Order. We express no view on 
Munsingwear’s implicit conclusion that repeal of administrative 
regulations cannot fairly be attributed to the Executive Branch 
when it litigates in the name of the United States.102 
Thus, one reading of Munsingwear suggests that vacatur is 
appropriate when a case is mooted because the underlying regulation 
 
 96. FALLON ET AL., supra note 78, at 192. 
 97. U.S. Bancorp Mortg. Co. v. Bonner Mall P’ship, 513 U.S. 18, 20 (1994). 
 98. Id. at 25. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. at 24. 
 101. Id. at 29. 
 102. Id. at 25 n.3 (citation omitted). 
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in dispute was repealed.103 As Bonner Mall points out, Munsingwear 
implies that the repeal of a regulation may be “happenstance”—
within the permissible bounds of vacatur—even when the government 
is a litigant.104 But Bonner Mall could be read as disapproving vacatur 
in Munsingwear-like scenarios, suggesting that repealing a regulation 
could count as a voluntary action that would preclude vacatur.105 
Ultimately, whether a rule rescission or change is a “vagary of 
circumstance”—vacatur proper—or the voluntary action of a 
litigant—vacatur improper—is a question not yet definitively 
answered by the Supreme Court. 
C.  Vacatur for Mootness, Law Changes, and the Lower Courts 
The lower court decisions offered in this Section address vacatur 
when a law change moots the underlying dispute. These decisions 
necessarily encompass more than just changes to an outgoing 
administration’s midnight rules, in part because appellate cases 
concerning midnight rules are uncommon.106 In this latter category, 
Wyoming II stands out as a rare example. There, the Tenth Circuit 
vacated the lower court’s ruling on the roadless rule because no facts 
indicated that the USDA had repealed the regulation to manipulate 
the district court’s ruling.107 Although the cases in this Section address 
changes that differ from the one at issue in Wyoming II, this Section 
shows that the same concerns underlie all vacatur-for-mootness 
analyses involving law changes. 
In Valero Terrestrial Co. v. Paige,108 the Fourth Circuit held that 
vacatur was proper when the mootness resulted from the West 
Virginia legislature’s amendment of a statutory provision and when 
the equities weighed in favor of vacatur.109 The Fourth Circuit noted 
that the defendants, who included state executives but not the 
 
 103. See, e.g., Wyoming v. USDA (Wyoming II), 414 F.3d 1207, 1213 (10th Cir. 2005) (“This 
is not a case in which a litigant is attempting to manipulate the courts to obtain the relief it was 
not able to win in the judicial system.”). 
 104. Bonner Mall, 513 U.S. at 25 n.3. 
 105. See Bayer, supra note 60 (“[W]here the government agency in the case moots the 
appeal by withdrawing its own contested policy or regulation, that action ordinarily will 
preclude vacatur.” (citing Amoco Oil Co. v. U.S. EPA, 231 F.3d 694, 698–99 (10th Cir. 2000); 19 
Solid Waste Dep’t Mechs. v. City of Albuquerque, 76 F.3d 1142, 1145 (10th Cir. 1996))). 
 106. See infra note 182 and accompanying text. 
 107. Wyoming II, 414 F.3d at 1213 n.6. 
 108. Valero Terrestrial Co. v. Paige, 211 F.3d 112 (4th Cir. 2000). 
 109. Id. at 123. 
CUENIN IN PRINTER PROOF 10/17/2010  10:28:22 PM 
2010] MOOTING THE NIGHT AWAY 469 
governor, were not responsible for the legislative action that mooted 
the case.110 “Therefore, defendant state executive officials are in a 
position akin to a party who finds its case mooted by happenstance, 
rather than events within its control. . . . As a result, the principal 
consideration under [Bonner Mall] counsels in favor of vacatur.”111 
In dictum, however, the Fourth Circuit explicitly acknowledged 
that mootness by regulation repeal may render vacatur improper and 
limited its holding accordingly: 
Because none of the changes in state law responsible for the 
mootness of this controversy were changes in administrative or 
executive regulations, we need not address ourselves to the question 
reserved by the Court in Bancorp of whether the “repeal of 
administrative regulations” can “fairly be attributed to the 
Executive Branch when it litigates in the name of the United 
States.”112 
The Third and D.C. Circuits have also held that Bonner Mall’s 
antivacatur presumption for voluntary actions does not apply when 
legislative action moots a government party’s appeal.113 Aside from 
the presumed legitimacy of legislative actions, the underlying 
reasoning is that “[t]he legislature may act out of reasons totally 
independent of the pending lawsuit, or because the lawsuit has 
convinced it that the existing law is flawed.”114  
Whether this deferential posture extends to administrative 
actions is unclear. For instance, the D.C. Circuit in National Black 
Police Ass’n v. District of Columbia115 implied that it may not have 
vacated had the action been rendered moot by an administrative, 
 
 110. Id. at 121. 
 111. Id.; see also NASD Dispute Resolution, Inc. v. Judicial Council, 488 F.3d 1065, 1069–70 
(9th Cir. 2007) (holding that because the disputed regulations had been struck down by the 
courts, and not repealed by any party to the litigation, the judicial resolution of the controversy 
qualified as happenstance and vacatur was permissible). 
 112. Valero, 211 F.3d at 121 n.4 (quoting U.S. Bancorp Mortg. Co. v. Bonner Mall P’ship, 
513 U.S. 18, 25 n.3 (1994)). 
 113. Khodara Envtl., Inc. ex rel. Eagle Envtl. L.P. v. Beckman, 237 F.3d 186, 194–95 (3d Cir. 
2001); Nat’l Black Police Ass’n v. District of Columbia, 108 F.3d 346, 351–52 (D.C. Cir. 1997); 
see also Rand, supra note 15, at 791 (“The [Bonner Mall] Court established a general 
presumption against vacatur that could only be overcome by ‘extraordinary circumstances’ . . . .” 
(quoting Bonner Mall, 513 U.S. at 29)). 
 114. Khodara, 237 F.3d at 195; see also Chem. Producers & Distribs. Ass’n v. Helliker, 463 
F.3d 871, 879 (9th Cir. 2006) (“Lobbying Congress or a state legislature cannot be viewed as 
‘causing’ subsequent legislation for purposes of the vacatur inquiry.”). 
 115. Nat’l Black Police Ass’n v. District of Columbia, 108 F.3d 346 (D.C. Cir. 1997). 
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rather than a legislative, action.116 In Cammermeyer v. Perry,117 the 
Ninth Circuit denied vacatur when the government reworked the 
offending regulation and reinstated Cammermeyer’s military 
commission during the course of the appeal, thus rendering the action 
moot.118 Following Bonner Mall, the court determined that the Army’s 
voluntary actions weighed against vacatur because “it was defendants 
who rendered this case moot by conceding that Cammermeyer should 
be reinstated and by replacing the challenged regulation.”119 
Perhaps the strongest argument against rule-change vacatur for 
mootness came from the Federal Circuit in 2009. In Tafas v. 
Kappos,120 the court denied vacatur of the district court’s judgment 
because the rescission of a U.S. Patent and Trademark Office 
(USPTO) rule mooted the dispute between the litigants.121 Citing 
Bonner Mall’s antivacatur language for cases mooted by the losing 
party’s actions, the court held that vacatur was “inappropriate under 
the circumstances.”122 By rescinding its rule pending appeal, the 
USPTO “acted unilaterally to render the case moot.”123 Although the 
USPTO and the other parties joining in its vacatur motion argued 
that vacatur was appropriate because mootness caused by a rule 
change was like mootness caused by legislative action—a scenario 
typically considered beyond the parties’ control and favoring 
vacatur124—the court found the analogy inapposite: 
This is not a case in which the regulations have been overridden by a 
statutory change; instead, it is a case in which the agency itself has 
voluntarily withdrawn the regulations and thus set the stage for a 
 
 116. See id. at 353 (“[T]he Bancorp presumption against vacatur might apply if the case has 
been rendered moot on appeal by enactment or repeal of a regulation, even though the courts 
accord the executive branch the same presumption of legitimate motive as is given the 
legislative branch.”). 
 117. Cammermeyer v. Perry, 97 F.3d 1235 (9th Cir. 1996). 
 118. Id. at 1239. In this case, the district court ruled that both Cammermeyer’s discharge 
from the military on the grounds of her sexual orientation and the Army’s homosexuality 
regulations were unconstitutional. Id. at 1237. Before the Ninth Circuit heard Cammermeyer’s 
appeal, she was reinstated and the Army implemented its “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” policy. Id. 
 119. Id. at 1239. 
 120. Tafas v. Kappos, 586 F.3d 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (en banc). 
 121. Id. at 1371. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. 
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declaration of mootness. . . . The agency does not control Congress; 
but it does control the decision to rescind the regulations.125 
As the losing party in the district court below, the USPTO had 
“procure[d] the conditions” through its rule change. The court thus 
refused the USPTO’s request to vacate the adverse judgment.126 
In sum, even when government entities are litigants, appellate 
courts have generally held that a legislative act or a judicial decision 
that occurs pending appeal and renders the appeal moot does not 
constitute voluntary action that weighs against vacatur.127 But when a 
government party changes or revokes a regulation midappeal, thus 
rendering the case moot, vacatur turns on whether the regulator 
appears to have been trying to manipulate the appellate process. For 
example, the Tenth Circuit in Wyoming II readily vacated the district 
court’s decision because the USDA lost below but changed its 
regulation to render the case moot.128 On the other hand, the Ninth 
Circuit in Cammermeyer refused to vacate the district court’s ruling 
that the Army’s sexual-orientation regulations were unconstitutional 
when the Army enacted its “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” policy during the 
appeal.129 The Federal Circuit reached the same conclusion when the 
USPTO mooted a case by changing its rule.130 These cases suggest that 
the nature of the regulation’s revocation is an important factor in a 
court’s decision to vacate as moot, but that the courts of appeals have 
not settled on which motives for changing rules are legitimate and 
thus support vacatur. The remainder of this Note examines where 
mootness caused by postelection changes to unfinished midnight rules 
fits within this analysis. 
III.  MIDNIGHT REGULATION: MOTIVES AND RESPONSES 
As Part II demonstrated, determining a party’s motive for 
mooting a dispute is central to the vacatur analysis. This Part 
examines a new administration’s possible motives for mooting 
 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. 
 127. See supra notes 108–14 and accompanying text. 
 128. See supra Part I.B; see also Rio Grande Silvery Minnow v. Keys, 355 F.3d 1215, 1220 
(10th Cir. 2004) (“When the government undertakes remedial measures that do not result in 
manipulation of the judicial process and eliminate the underlying cause of an injunction, vacatur 
will be granted.”). 
 129. See supra notes 117–19 and accompanying text. 
 130. See supra text accompanying notes 120–26. 
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litigation over an outgoing administration’s unfinished midnight rules. 
The discussion explains that postinauguration changes to midnight 
rules are largely responses to an outgoing administration’s last acts in 
office. This part also surveys executive-branch tactics for countering 
midnight regulations and judicial review of posttransition rules 
changes. 
A.  The Controversy and Motives Surrounding Midnight  Regulation 
The upswing in regulatory activity that takes place when a new 
president is elected has been well documented.131 This activity has 
garnered rapt media attention132 and has generated a wealth of 
academic interest in the outgoing president’s power during the 
transition period.133 Observers scrutinize primarily the legitimacy of 
increased regulatory activity in the last days of an administration—
particularly when the incoming administration is of a different 
political party.134 
 
 131. See, e.g., William G. Howell & Kenneth R. Mayer, The Last One Hundred Days, 35 
PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 533, 550 (2005) (demonstrating empirically that presidents exercise 
their power up to the last moment); see also Jack M. Beermann & William P. Marshall, The 
Constitutional Law of Presidential Transitions, 84 N.C. L. REV. 1253, 1262 (2006) (“The 
certainty of the deadline [marking the end of the outgoing president’s term] and the lengthy 
period between the election and the inauguration of the new president provide conditions for a 
great deal of late-term activity by an outgoing administration.”); Howell & Mayer, supra, at 550 
(“[P]residents squeeze the[] last moments in office for all they are worth, issuing all sorts of 
rules and directives, many of which cannot be changed without exacting a significant political 
price . . . . While legislative processes may lay dormant at the end of a presidential term, the 
production of unilateral directives kicks into high gear.”). 
 132. See, e.g., Tim Dickinson, Bush’s Final F.U., ROLLING STONE, Dec. 25, 2008, at 57 
(chronicling the Bush administration’s last-minute regulations); Elizabeth Kolbert, Comment, 
Midnight Hour, NEW YORKER, Nov. 24, 2008, at 39, 39 (describing midnight regulation 
generally and commenting on the Bush administration specifically); Cindy Skrzycki, Democrats 
Eye Bush Midnight Regulations, WASH. POST, Nov. 11, 2008, at E1 (discussing the Obama 
administration’s potential response to Bush’s last-minute regulations). 
 133. See, e.g., Beermann & Marshall, supra note 131 (evaluating how the Constitution and 
midnight regulation might interact); Howell & Mayer, supra note 131 (discussing how the 
outgoing administration might tie the hands of its successor); O’Connell, supra note 23 
(conducting an empirical analysis of regulatory action, focusing in part on political transitions). 
 134. See, e.g., Beermann & Marshall, supra note 131, at 1266–67 (“The output of the 
outgoing administration, including presidential and agency action of various types, tends to 
increase substantially, especially when the outgoing administration is of the Democratic Party 
and the incoming President is a Republican.”); O’Connell, supra note 23, at 913 n.76 (collecting 
much of the negative commentary on midnight rulemaking). The main charges leveled against 
midnight rulemaking are that it undermines presidential and administrative accountability, 
promotes inefficiency, and is just wrong in principle. See, e.g., Brito & de Rugy, supra note 1, at 
173–77 (citing William S. Morrow, Jr., Midnight Regulations: Natural Order or Disorderly 
Governance, ADMIN. & REG. L. NEWS, Spring 2001, at 3, 18). But see Jack M. Beermann, 
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Though scholars have long studied and documented midnight 
regulation, the presidential motive for the practice is an open 
question.135 One possible reason for midnight regulations might be 
“the natural human tendency to work to deadline, which has been 
referred to in the literature as the ‘Cinderella constraint.’”136 As 
Professor Jack Beermann points out, however, this explanation does 
not fully account for the “unseeml[iness]” of midnight rulemaking.137 
Instead, evidence suggests that outgoing presidents regulate at 
midnight for strategic reasons.138 Professor Beermann, for example, 
attributes the practice to three additional causes, two of which are 
political: “[h]urrying” to “project [a] substantive agenda as far into 
the future as possible,” “[w]aiting” to regulate at a moment that 
“avoid[s] political consequences that might have been costly earlier in 
the term,” and being “delayed by some external force.”139 Or, these 
rules could be the result of strategic political “timing.”140 Because of 
these other reasons, midnight regulation has been described as “an 
important political weapon.”141 For the most part, outgoing presidents 
use midnight regulation to “burrow” policy before leaving office.142 
 
Presidential Power in Transitions, 83 B.U. L. REV. 948, 952 (2003) (arguing that even if 
presidents have sinister motives behind midnight regulations, “[e]fforts to embarrass or 
hamstring the incoming administration are all part of the political process,” and “the outgoing 
administration should be free to advance its political agenda until the end of its term”). 
 135. See, e.g., Jack M. Beermann, Combating Midnight Regulation, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 
COLLOQUY 352, 352 (2009), http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/colloquy/2009/9/ 
LRColl2009n9Beermann.pdf (“While midnight regulation provokes an instinctively negative 
reaction, it is not completely clear what is wrong with it.”). 
 136. Id. (quoting Jay Cochran, III, The Cinderella Constraint: Why Regulations Increase 
Significantly During Post-Election Quarters (Mar. 8, 2001) (unpublished manuscript), available 
at http://mercatus.org/sites/default/files/publication/The_Cinderella_Constraint(1).pdf). 
 137. Beermann, supra note 134, at 948. 
 138. See Beermann, supra note 135, at 352 (explaining the predominantly strategic uses of 
midnight regulation); see also Brito & de Rugy, supra note 1, at 172 (“[P]assing midnight 
regulations is a winning strategy for an outgoing president who wishes to project his influence 
into the future.”). 
 139. Beermann, supra note 134, at 956. 
 140. Beermann, supra note 135, at 352 (“Timing is a form of waiting, not based on potential 
negative consequences, but rather . . . in order to help either one’s own reelection bid or the 
election prospects of the incumbent party.”). 
 141. Morriss et al., supra note 2, at 588. 
 142. Mendelson, supra note 5, at 559–63. Granted, not all late-term regulations are issued 
strategically or politically. See RUSHING ET AL., supra note 6, at 3 (“Most administrations pump 
out a stream of new regulations at the end of a president’s term. . . . But not all midnight 
regulations are created equal.”). This issue raises a characterization problem as “the line 
between permissible late-term action and undesirable ‘midnight regulation’ is unlikely to be 
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Research suggests that midnight regulation is an effective political 
strategy because an outgoing president can “tie a new President’s 
hands” by regulating at midnight.143 
Conversely, the incoming president might want to undo his 
predecessor’s midnight regulations. The incoming president’s motives 
may be political, such as when a new president wants to rescind a rule 
that contradicts his own platform144 or when the regulation offends the 
new administration’s beliefs about the proper role of regulation.145 
The new president might also suspect the regulatory procedures that 
the old administration used before leaving office were deficient and 
thus might want to redo the rulemaking process to get wider input 
and better information.146 Finally, the new president might decide that 
the rule is bad policy.147 
For present purposes, however, a fine distinction between 
politics and policy is unnecessary. Even assuming that a neutral 
observer like a court could discern political motive from policy 
motive, it could not do so without difficulty. For example, a new 
president might offer a policy-based reason for changing a rule, even 
if the true motive for doing so is that keeping the rule would cost him 
politically among his supporters. Indeed, the Supreme Court has 
indicated the difficulty of discerning political motive and has 
accordingly set a low bar for determining whether justifications for 
agency position changes are legitimate.148 Thus, for any given change 
to an unfinished midnight rule, the motive could arguably be 
 
particularly clear and is largely in the eye of the beholder.” Beermann & Marshall, supra note 
131, at 1287. 
 143. Beermann, supra note 134, at 984. 
 144. See Mendelson, supra note 5, at 599–602 (explaining the political consequences of 
midnight regulations for incoming presidents and arguing that “from the President-elect’s 
standpoint, late-term policy entrenchment by the outgoing President is undeniably costly”); see 
also Morriss et al., supra note 2, at 553, 557–59 (describing the “politicization” surrounding 
midnight rulemaking). 
 145. See, e.g., Loring & Roth, supra note 9, at 1457 (explaining that President George W. 
Bush desired to rescind many Clinton midnight regulations because of President Bush’s “anti-
regulatory leaning,” but that the Bush administration did not do so because “deregulation 
may . . . prove more difficult to justify”). 
 146. See Morriss et al., supra note 2, at 558 (explaining midnight rulemaking’s “significant 
defects,” including “sloppiness”); cf. Jack, supra note 43, at 1482 (explaining that the Bush 
administration argued that “withdrawals and delays were necessary given the ‘haphazard’ and 
‘last-minute’ nature of regulations issued under the Clinton Administration”). 
 147. For a discussion of a classic example of this pattern, see infra notes 195–201, 205–07 and 
accompanying text. 
 148. See infra text accompanying notes 216–17. 
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attributed to politics or policy. Ultimately, just as outgoing presidents 
likely have political motives for midnight regulation, incoming 
presidents likely have political motives for wanting to undo these 
rules. 
Whether politically motivated midnight rulemaking is 
problematic ties into larger legitimacy concerns. As Professor 
Beermann phrased it, pinpointing the problem with midnight 
rulemaking is difficult: 
[T]here seems to be a general perception that something has gone 
wrong when an outgoing administration takes important action 
while the incoming administration is waiting to take over. Most late-
term action is subject to the obvious question of why, if the 
regulation was deemed so important, the administration failed to act 
during the previous three or seven and three-quarters years.149 
Fundamentally, whether one perceives midnight rulemaking as 
problematic rests upon what one perceives as regulation’s proper role 
in the administrative state.150 Under one model of the administrative 
state, agencies are technocratic experts, constantly promulgating new 
regulations in the search for the optimal balance of health, safety, 
cost, and other factors.151 If this model embodies the proper role of 
agencies, then midnight rulemaking seems deeply troubling because it 
introduces politics and a risk of procedural deficiency into the 
rulemaking calculus.152 Midnight rulemaking seems similarly 
problematic under another administrative paradigm that views 
agencies as the direct agents of Congress, executing only legislative 
intent through regulation.153 
Another model of the administrative state, however, views 
agencies as democratically accountable agents of the president.154 
 
 149. Beermann, supra note 135, at 353. 
 150. For deep background on the modern administrative state, see generally Richard B. 
Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1667 (1975). 
 151. This model is commonly known as the “expertise” model. See, e.g., Lisa Schultz 
Bressman, Beyond Accountability: Arbitrariness and Legitimacy in the Administrative State, 78 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 461, 464 (2003) (noting that the “‘expertise’ model” posits that agencies “merely 
execute technocratic judgments”); Stewart, supra note 150, at 1678 (discussing the expertise 
model). 
 152. See supra notes 138–43 and accompanying text. 
 153. For a discussion of this “transmission belt” model, see Stewart, supra note 150, at 1675–
76. 
 154. See generally Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245 (2001) 
(arguing that agencies are accountable to the president). 
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Under this presidential-control model, midnight rulemaking is an 
expected and legitimate extension of presidential power.155 But if 
regulating at midnight is a legitimate part of presidential power, then 
it follows logically that incoming presidents would come to office 
seeking to undo the unfinished midnight regulations left by their 
predecessors. Undoing midnight regulations becomes just as much a 
part of presidential control as midnight regulation itself. 
None of these models paints a complete picture of the 
administrative state. Though the presidential-control model has 
become the predominant theory156 and has even found support in the 
Supreme Court’s Fox decision,157 it does not fully explain how 
agencies operate.158 Even looking at agencies through the lens of 
presidential-control theory does not solve the puzzle of whether 
midnight rulemaking is proper, but merely shifts focus to the balance 
of power between outgoing and incoming presidents in the issuance 
and undoing of midnight regulations.159 Although this Note does not 
address which model is proper, the unresolved debate between 
proponents of the predominant regulatory models may help explain 
why midnight rulemaking remains controversial. 
B.  Action in Response to Midnight Regulation 
Although midnight rulemaking’s underlying propriety is 
debatable, the practice evokes an inflammatory response.160 Also 
concerned by the practice, Congress, the president, and agencies have 
established various mechanisms for dealing with midnight 
 
 155. See id. at 2331–39 (describing agency accountability under the presidential-control 
model). 
 156. Bressman, supra note 151, at 470. 
 157. See infra discussion accompanying notes 233–35. For a discussion of Fox and the 
legitimacy of political motives for agency position changes, see infra Part III.C.2–3. 
 158. See Bressman, supra note 151, at 463 n.3 (collecting sources that critique the 
presidential-control model as incomplete). 
 159. Indeed, the larger debate over the balance of power between outgoing and incoming 
presidents already exists. See, e.g., SANFORD LEVINSON, OUR UNDEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION 
98–101 (2006) (arguing that the time lapse between election day and inauguration day hurts 
political accountability); Nina A. Mendelson, Quick off the Mark? In Favor of Empowering the 
President-Elect, 103 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 464, 464–66 (2009), http://www.law. 
northwestern.edu/lawreview/colloquy/2009/19/LRColl2009n19Mendelson.pdf (suggesting that 
more should be done to give an incoming president some political control during the transition). 
 160. See, e.g., Mendelson, supra note 5, at 625 (“Newspapers with national circulation, such 
[as] the New York Times, the Wall Street Journal, the Los Angeles Times, and the Washington 
Post reported on the details of [a Clinton midnight] rule and the Bush administration’s response 
to it, the progress of lawsuits against the rule, and public reaction.”). 
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regulations.161 In practice, however, the main responses to midnight 
rulemaking have been executive suspensions of the effective dates of 
midnight rules162 and judicial challenges to controversial regulations.163 
Although Congress also exercises limited control over midnight 
rulemaking,164 this Section focuses on executive responses to the 
phenomenon. 
Cleaning up after midnight takes a new administration a lot of 
time and effort.165 With respect to the incoming administration, “it has 
become a tradition for the incoming Chief of Staff to issue a memo on 
inauguration day halting the publication of any remaining regulatory 
actions and pulling back recent regulations not yet effective.”166 
 
 161. See generally Brito & de Rugy, supra note 1, at 177–90 (giving a history and overview of 
regulatory review systems as well as their relation to midnight regulatory review). 
 162. See Jack, supra note 43, at 1482 (“[A]n incoming administration’s withdrawal and 
suspension of [midnight] rules has become a familiar, if not inevitable, post-election 
phenomenon.”). 
 163. See, e.g., Morriss et al., supra note 2, at 589–94 (noting that President Clinton’s late-
term mining rules were “immediately” challenged in court); see also Jim Rossi, Bargaining in the 
Shadow of Administrative Procedure: The Public Interest in Rulemaking Settlement, 51 DUKE 
L.J. 1015, 1039–43 (2001) (explaining that an incoming administration could handle the barrage 
of lawsuits over its predecessor’s midnight rules by settling those cases). 
 164. For example, a midnight rule could be rescinded by Congress under the Congressional 
Review Act of 1996 (CRA), 5 U.S.C. § 802 (2006), a “blunt tool . . . [that] has only been used 
once” to overturn a midnight rule, Susan E. Dudley, Regulatory Activity in the Bush 
Administration at the Stroke of Midnight, ENGAGE, July 2009, at 27, 29. “From its enactment in 
1996 through March 2008, agencies have submitted 731 major rules to Congress, and only one, 
the Clinton ergonomics rule, has been repealed under the CRA.” Note, The Mysteries of the 
Congressional Review Act, 122 HARV. L. REV. 2162, 2169 (2009). The Obama administration 
did not use it to undo any midnight regulations left by the Bush administration. COPELAND, 
supra note 20, at 1. For a more in-depth analysis of the CRA review mechanisms, see generally 
Daniel Cohen & Peter L. Strauss, Congressional Review of Agency Regulations, 49 ADMIN. L. 
REV. 95 (1997). 
  Although not discussed here, there have been other suggestions for Congressional 
oversight of midnight regulations, including Representative Nadler’s proposed Midnight Rule 
Act, H.R. 34, 111th Cong. (2009). But see Beermann, supra note 135, at 359–69 (critiquing the 
Midnight Rule Act). 
 165. See Beermann, supra note 134, at 986 (“[R]eviewing late-term actions by the Clinton 
administration occupied a great deal of agency officials’ time and energy in the early days of the 
administration.”). 
 166. Dudley, supra note 164, at 29. But see B.J. Sanford, Note, Midnight Regulations, 
Judicial Review, and the Formal Limits of Presidential Rulemaking, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 782, 784 
(2003) (arguing that these suspension memoranda are illegal and should be struck down by the 
courts). There have been other suggestions for executive control. See, e.g., Brito & de Rugy, 
supra note 1, at 191–96 (proposing a limit on the number of rules that can be reviewed by the 
Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs within a prescribed period before a transition). 
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Since Reagan, every president taking over from a president of the 
opposing political party has ordered a similar regulatory 
moratorium. For example, two days after taking office, President 
Clinton issued a directive to all agencies ordering them to 
“withdraw . . . all regulations that have not yet been published in the 
Federal Register.” George W. Bush issued a similar directive the 
day he took office, ordering agencies to halt rules from being 
published in the Federal Register and “temporarily postpone the 
effective date of the [published] regulations for 60 days.” President 
Barack Obama’s Chief of Staff Rahm Emanuel also issued a memo 
withdrawing rules not yet published in the Federal Register.167 
Executive memoranda issued by both incoming and outgoing 
administrations have become the predominant strategies for 
counteracting midnight regulation.168 Although limited to the most 
last-minute of unfinished midnight rules,169 these memoranda have 
effectively enabled incoming presidents to change course quickly 
from their predecessors.170 Moreover, these suspension and 
withdrawal memoranda are frequently suggested to new presidents as 
one of the most effective means for handling midnight regulations.171 
Although these suspensions do not stand to end midnight rulemaking, 
their enduring use after future presidential transitions seems 
inevitable.172 
 
 167. Brito & de Rugy, supra note 1, at 189 (alteration in original) (footnotes omitted); see 
also Beermann, supra note 135, at 360 (“[O]n his first day in office President Obama directed 
his administration not to issue any new rules until his appointees had a chance to review them, 
to withdraw from publication any proposed or final rules that had been sent to the Federal 
Register but not yet published, and to consider extending the effective date of published rules 
that had not yet gone into effect . . . .”). 
 168. See Beermann, supra note 135, at 360 (“Presidents may already have sufficient tools to 
deal with midnight regulation, as demonstrated by action taken by the administrations of 
Presidents Ronald Reagan, Bill Clinton, George W. Bush, and Barack Obama to combat the 
midnight regulatory activity of their respective predecessors.”). 
 169. See CURTIS W. COPELAND, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL34747, MIDNIGHT 
RULEMAKING: CONSIDERATIONS FOR CONGRESS AND A NEW ADMINISTRATION 7 (2008) 
(“[F]or rules that have already been published in the Federal Register, the only way for the 
departments or agencies to eliminate or change the rules is by going back through the 
rulemaking process.”). 
 170. See supra note 168. 
 171. E.g., COPELAND, supra note 169, at 7–9 (suggesting such memoranda and giving a 
history of their use); RUSHING ET AL., supra note 6, at 6 (suggesting using memoranda that 
“suspend effective dates” of unfinished midnight rules). 
 172. See COPELAND, supra note 20, at 3 (“The [Obama administration’s] Emanuel and 
Orszag memoranda were only the latest in a long history of incoming presidential 
administrations imposing a moratorium on new regulations . . . .”). 
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C.  Judicial Review of Postinauguration Changes to an  Outgoing 
Administration’s Midnight Regulations 
Presidents may take office faced with litigation arising from their 
predecessors’ midnight regulations. For instance, courts handed the 
Bush administration several prominent setbacks in its attempts to 
undo the Clinton administration’s last regulations, including the 
Department of Energy’s energy-efficiency standards for air 
conditioners173 and a National Park Service rule banning snowmobiles 
in Yellowstone.174 Similarly, President Bush’s midnight hours-of-
service rule for truckers has faced legal opposition from the early 
days of the Obama administration.175 
Incoming administrations have faced the difficulty of explaining 
why a rule promulgated by the previous administration—albeit 
hurriedly—is no longer valid and should be modified or rescinded.176 
Although the reasons for these reconsiderations may be political,177 
the government has had trouble defending its responses to midnight 
rules on this ground because of the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Ass’n v. State Farm Mutual Automobile 
Insurance Co.178 That case set a high bar for an agency’s justification 
 
 173. Energy Conservation Program for Consumer Products: Energy Conservation Standards 
for Central Air Conditioners and Heat Pumps, 66 Fed. Reg. 7170 (Jan. 22, 2001) (codified at 10 
C.F.R. pt. 430); see also Natural Res. Def. Council v. Abraham, 355 F.3d 179, 202–03 (2d Cir. 
2004) (holding that the rule was final and could not be reopened for comment). 
 174. Special Regulations, Areas of the National Park System, 66 Fed. Reg. 7260 (Jan. 22, 
2001) (codified at 36 C.F.R. pt. 7); see also Fund for Animals v. Norton, 294 F. Supp. 2d 92, 105–
08 (D.D.C. 2003) (invalidating the Bush administration’s modification of the Clinton 
administration’s rule). 
 175. Hours of Service of Drivers, 73 Fed. Reg. 69,567 (Nov. 19, 2008) (codified at 49 C.F.R. 
pts. 385, 395); see also Petition for Review at 1, Pub. Citizen v. Fed. Motor Carrier Safety 
Admin., No. 09-1094 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 09, 2009), available at http://www.citizen.org/documents/ 
PetitionforReview1.pdf (challenging the driver-service-hour rule). Currently, the case is in 
abeyance, as the Obama administration settled to start a new rulemaking. Joint Motion of 
Petitioners and Respondent to Hold Case in Abeyance Pending the Issuance of a New Notice of 
Proposed Rulemaking at 2, Pub. Citizen v. Fed. Motor Carrier Safety Admin., No. 09-1094 
(D.C. Cir. Oct. 26, 2009). 
 176. See, e.g., David H. Becker, Changing Direction in Administrative Agency Rulemaking: 
“Reasoned Analysis,” The Roadless Rule Repeal, and the 2006 National Park Service 
Management Policies, 30 ENVIRONS ENVTL. L. & POL’Y J. 65, 70 n.21 (2006) (“[The] 
explanations for withdrawing a proposed regulation, a ‘change in agency priorities,’ was . . . ‘not 
informative in the least; it is merely a reiteration of the decision to withdraw the proposed 
rule . . . .’” (quoting United Mine Workers v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 358 F.3d 40, 44 (D.C. Cir. 
2004))); see also infra notes 202–08 and accompanying text. 
 177. See supra Part III.A. 
 178. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983). 
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for a rule rescission, requiring a more extensive rationale than for 
regulating in the first place.179 As Professor Beermann put it, “The 
Supreme Court’s application of the arbitrary and capricious standard 
to rescission and revision of rules has created some of the difficulties 
that incoming administrations encounter when trying to undo 
midnight rules.”180 
Authoritative judicial pronouncements are conspicuously absent 
on the scope of regulatory power surrounding the transition period.181 
For midnight regulations, at least, the lack of judicial precedent may 
be traceable to the fact that a new administration may moot a 
controversy by rescinding the midnight regulation, thus precluding 
further judicial review.182 Primarily, this Section explains the issues of 
judicial review of midnight-rule procedure and examines the Supreme 
Court’s recent FCC v. Fox decision, which may signal a lessening of 
 
 179. See id. at 42 (“[A]n agency changing its course by rescinding a rule is obligated to 
supply a reasoned analysis for the change beyond that which may be required when an agency 
does not act in the first instance.”); Marianne Koral Smythe, Judicial Review of Rule 
Rescissions, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1928, 1934 (1984) (“The . . . statement in the State Farm opinion 
that may be a source of trouble stems from language to the effect that there is an implicit 
congressional endorsement of the regulatory status quo. Pursuant to this rationale, the only 
legitimate basis for rule rescissions would be a change in circumstances, not a change in 
policy . . . .”); Jack, supra note 43, at 1502 (“[T]he [State Farm] Court established a presumption 
in favor of the validity of a prior rule and ‘against changes in current policy that are not justified 
by the rulemaking record.’” (quoting State Farm, 463 U.S. at 42)); see also Loring & Roth, supra 
note 9, at 1441–42 (“As a result of State Farm, it is possible that an incoming anti-regulatory 
administration faces more obstacles in repealing or amending midnight regulations that affect 
public health and safety than a pro-regulatory administration.”). 
 180. Beermann, supra note 135, at 361. 
 181. See Beermann & Marshall, supra note 131, at 1270 (“There are no cases addressing 
presidential duties and obligations with respect to transition . . . .”). 
 182. See O’Connell, supra note 23, at 905 (“If a midnight regulation is rescinded or 
modified, any challenge to the original regulation’s timing is mooted.”); see also Beermann & 
Marshall, supra note 131, at 1270 n.72 (explaining that any issue of the president’s power in the 
transition period will likely escape review because the “transition period is so short that the 
issue might be moot by the time it is ready for legal resolution”). But cf. Christopher N. May, 
Presidential Defiance of “Unconstitutional” Laws: Reviving the Royal Prerogative, 21 HASTINGS 
CONST. L.Q. 865, 992–96 (1994) (arguing that when a President refuses to execute a law as 
unconstitutional, he should ensure that the question is subjected to judicial review). 
  This Note does not discuss whether rule changes might evade mootness under the 
voluntary cessation doctrine. See FALLON ET AL., supra note 78, at 189–90 (“[A]n 
action . . . does not become moot merely because the conduct immediately complained of has 
terminated, if there is a sufficient possibility of a recurrence that would be barred by a proper 
decree.”). Rather, this Note assumes, as do the scholars cited above, that the posttransition 
regulatory process does not count as a voluntary cessation that would preclude mootness. 
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State Farm’s impediments to incoming presidents who want to undo 
midnight rules.183 
1. Legal Background: Administrative Procedure, State Farm, and 
Midnight Regulations.  Agency rulemaking procedure is dictated 
largely by the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).184 Today, most 
rulemaking proceeds under the APA’s provisions for informal 
rulemaking—also known as notice-and-comment rulemaking.185 
Under notice-and-comment rulemaking, an agency must publish a 
notice of intent in the Federal Register regarding the proposed rule, 
solicit public comments for a specified period, and, if it decides to 
issue the final rule, provide a “concise general statement of [its] basis 
and purpose” that addresses all material comments no fewer than 
thirty days before the rule’s effective date.186 A rule takes over three 
years on average to promulgate under notice-and-comment 
rulemaking procedures.187 Thus, the APA leaves little time for an 
outgoing administration’s last-minute rulemaking.188 As agencies rush 
to issue final regulations before the president leaves office, these rules 
run a high risk of procedural deficiency.189 Many midnight rules have 
 
 183. For an overview of judicial review of administrative procedure in the midnight 
regulation context, see O’Connell, supra note 23, at 905–08. 
 184. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551–559, 701–706 (2006); see also Vt. 
Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 435 U.S. 519, 545–49 (1978) (holding 
that courts cannot require agencies to follow rulemaking procedures beyond those that the 
APA or another statute requires). 
 185. 5 U.S.C. § 553; see also O’Connell, supra note 23, at 901 (“[T]he magic words ‘on the 
record after opportunity for [a] . . . hearing’ were typically sufficient to require agencies to 
undertake formal rulemaking procedures. . . . Because so few statutes contain the phrase, 
agencies generally do not conduct formal rulemakings when promulgating legally binding 
regulations.” (second alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Fla. E. Coast Ry. Co., 410 
U.S. 224, 236–38 (1973))). 
 186. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)–(d). Though Section 553 mentions a “concise” statement, modern 
administrative law doctrine prompts agencies to produce extensive records, explanations, and 
responses to comments. See, e.g., Jack M. Beermann & Gary Lawson, Reprocessing Vermont 
Yankee, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 856, 899 (2007) (explaining that to avoid procedural 
deficiency, agencies “overproceduralize rulemaking by issuing . . . highly detailed proposed rules 
with voluminous supporting material, and by conducting additional comment periods whenever 
a significant change is warranted by the comments”). 
 187. STEPHEN G. BREYER, RICHARD B. STEWART, CASS R. SUNSTEIN & ADRIAN 
VERMEULE, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULATORY POLICY 566 (6th ed. 2006). 
 188. Cf. Wyoming v. USDA (Wyoming I), 277 F. Supp. 2d 1197, 1206 (D. Wyo. 2003), 
vacated as moot, 414 F.3d 1207 (10th Cir. 2005) (observing that an agency had to follow “a very 
short timeframe” to promulgate a rule before President Clinton left office). 
 189. See Morriss et al., supra note 2, at 558 & nn.33–34 (suggesting that procedural 
“sloppiness” is characteristic of midnight rulemaking). 
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been struck down by courts for failing to meet either the APA or 
another statute’s procedural requirements because they are rushed 
through the prescribed process.190 
Courts reviewing an agency’s rule promulgated under notice-
and-comment rulemaking apply the APA’s “arbitrary and capricious” 
standard of judicial review.191 For rule rescissions, the State Farm 
Court interpreted the arbitrary-and-capricious standard to mean that 
“an agency changing its course by rescinding a rule is obligated to 
supply a reasoned analysis for the change beyond that which may be 
required when an agency does not act in the first instance.”192 
[T]he revocation of an extant regulation is substantially different 
than a failure to act. Revocation constitutes a reversal of the 
agency’s former views as to the proper course. A “settled course of 
behavior embodies the agency’s informed judgment that, by 
pursuing that course, it will carry out the policies committed to it by 
Congress. There is . . . a presumption that those policies will be 
carried out best if the settled rule is adhered to.”193 
Thus, the Court “reject[ed] outright the government’s contention that 
rule rescissions should be narrowly reviewed and in essence treated 
like agency decisions not to act.”194 
 
 190. E.g., Wyoming I, 277 F. Supp. 2d at 1239 (stating that a rule’s promulgation was “driven 
by political haste,” “violated the [procedural requirements of the] National Environmental 
Policy Act and the Wilderness Act,” and was therefore arbitrary and capricious under the 
APA); see also COPELAND, supra note 20, at 7–24 (describing twenty-five Bush administration 
midnight rules whose procedural validity has been challenged successfully). 
 191. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (“The reviewing court shall hold unlawful and set aside 
agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, 
or otherwise not in accordance with law.”). 
 192. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 42 (1983). 
Over time, courts have broadened the scope of this holding beyond rule rescissions to cover all 
sorts of agency position changes. See Becker, supra note 176, at 66 & nn.3–6 (explaining the 
expanded scope of the State Farm doctrine and collecting cases). Observers have seen this 
development as part of a body of administrative law that demands agencies act consistently and 
with reason. See id. at 66 n.1 (explaining that the reason-and-consistency requirement is a 
“settled principle of administrative law” and providing its background). 
 193. State Farm, 463 U.S. at 41–42 (quoting Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Wichita 
Bd. of Trade, 412 U.S. 800, 807–08 (1973)). 
 194. Smythe, supra note 179, at 1933–34; see also State Farm, 463 U.S. at 57 (“An agency’s 
view of what is in the public interest may change, either with or without a change in 
circumstances. But an agency changing its course must supply a reasoned analysis . . . [which] 
the agency has failed to supply . . . .” (footnote omitted in original) (quoting Greater Bos. 
Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 852 (1970)) (internal quotation marks omitted)); 
Beermann, supra note 134, at 984 (“[T]he Court took the regulatory status quo as the baseline 
and reviewed whether the new administration had articulated a sufficient justification for 
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Also at issue in State Farm were the seemingly political motives 
for the underlying rule rescission.195 The contested rule, which 
required that new automobiles be sold with passive restraints like 
airbags, had been promulgated under President Carter but was 
promptly rescinded once President Reagan took office.196 The 
government argued, in part, that this political change supported the 
National Highway Transportation Safety Administration’s (NHTSA) 
decision to reevaluate the regulatory record and rescind the passive 
restraint rule.197 The majority implicitly rejected the government’s 
argument, holding instead that the reasons the government gave for 
the rescission were inadequate.198 The majority viewed the political 
explanation as tantamount to ignoring the rule’s supporting evidence 
and thus held that the rescission was arbitrary and capricious.199 
Justice Rehnquist, however, agreed with the government’s 
reasoning: “A change in administration brought about by the people 
casting their votes is a perfectly reasonable basis for an executive 
agency’s reappraisal of . . . its programs and regulations.”200 Justice 
Rehnquist reasoned that the agency should give a “rational 
explanation” for rescinding the rule, but believed that the political 
factors at play sufficiently explained the rescission of the passive 
restraint rule such that NHTSA’s decision was not arbitrary or 
capricious.201 
 
making a change.”). 
 195. See State Farm, 463 U.S. at 59 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) 
(“The agency’s changed view of the standard seems to be related to the election of a new 
President of a different political party.”); see also Kagan, supra note 154, at 2382 (“President 
Reagan took office with a clear (de)regulatory philosophy.”). 
 196. See State Farm, 463 U.S. at 35–40 (providing the passive-restraint rule’s history). 
 197. See Smythe, supra note 179, at 1933–34 (“The decision to rescind was thus a political 
decision, made because the new administration had pronounced policy differences from the old. 
The decision to rescind also represented . . . a policy reversal. [Thus,] the government[] 
conten[ded] that rule rescissions should be narrowly reviewed and . . . treated like agency 
decisions not to act.”). 
 198. State Farm, 463 U.S. at 55–57. 
 199. See id. at 56 (“[T]he agency has failed to offer the rational connection between facts 
and judgment required to pass muster under the arbitrary-and-capricious standard.”); see also 
Smythe, supra note 179, at 1934–35 (arguing that the State Farm majority viewed the political 
reasons for the rescission as not “justified by the rulemaking record” but not inherently 
unacceptable (quoting State Farm, 463 U.S. at 42)). 
 200. State Farm, 463 U.S. at 59 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) 
(footnote omitted). 
 201. Id. at 58. 
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Although the Supreme Court did not directly address midnight 
regulation in State Farm, the case has long been viewed as an obstacle 
for incoming presidents wishing to undo the midnight regulations left 
by their predecessors. First, State Farm could be interpreted as 
requiring an agency to provide a more extensive rationale to justify 
rescinding a rule than was required to support the decision to regulate 
initially.202 Under this standard, the outgoing administration would 
enjoy the ability to regulate at midnight based on a less extensive 
justification than its successor would need to rescind the rule.203 
State Farm also foreclosed an important explanation underlying a 
new president’s desire to undo midnight regulations—politics.204 In 
State Farm, politics were an important reason behind the NHTSA’s 
decision to rescind the passive-restraints rule. President Reagan had 
successfully campaigned for office on a deregulatory platform and 
saw the passive-restraint rule as a Carter-administration vestige.205 
Other presidential transitions have followed a similar pattern.206 Yet 
State Farm deemed a political explanation for rescinding a rule left by 
an outgoing president an insufficient justification. Although Justice 
Rehnquist believed that a new president should have the power to 
reconsider his predecessor’s rules by virtue of having been elected to 
office, this view failed to garner majority support.207 Because the 
Court appeared to mandate a heightened standard for rule 
rescissions, State Farm became the leading case on what was required 
 
 202. See, e.g., Smythe, supra note 179, at 1934 (“[State Farm] can be viewed as requiring 
agencies seeking to rescind regulations to meet a more stringent evidentiary burden than would 
be required if the agency were promulgating a rule in the first instance.”); see also Becker, supra 
note 176, at 80–83 (surveying federal appellate cases that invalidated rule changes under this 
heightened burden). 
 203. See Beermann, supra note 134, at 984 (“[P]rior administrative action can tie a new 
President’s hands more than if the President had to worry only about whether administrative 
action complies with applicable statutes.”). 
 204. See Kagan, supra note 154, at 2380 (arguing that the State Farm Court “implicitly 
rejected” a justification for agency position changes “centered on the political leadership and 
accountability provided by the President”); see also Mendelson, supra note 5, at 601–02 
(explaining that a new president will take office wanting to change midnight rules that conflict 
with his “policy agenda”). 
 205. Kagan, supra note 154, at 2382. 
 206. For example, President Bush tried undoing the Clinton administration’s last rules. 
Beerman & Marshall, supra note 131, at 1267 n.64. President Obama attempted the same for the 
Bush administration’s midnight rules. See COPELAND, supra note 20, at 3–24 (cataloguing the 
Obama administration’s efforts to undo the Bush administration’s midnight regulations); Cindy 
Skrzycki, Obama Team Tracks Bush’s ‘Midnight’ Rules Rush, BLOOMBERG (Nov. 11, 2008, 
00:00 EST), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20670001&sid=aq8Q2ZkT1fsw (same). 
 207. See supra notes 195–201 and accompanying text. 
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to support any agency rule change, including those made to midnight 
rules after a new administration had taken office.208 
2. Reevaluating State Farm in FCC v. Fox.  In 2009, the Supreme 
Court decided FCC v. Fox, a case that dealt with expletives aired on 
national television during high-viewership periods.209 At issue was the 
Federal Communication Commission’s (FCC) fleeting expletive 
standard, a policy that had been in place for decades but was 
eliminated in response to pressure from the Bush administration and 
its supporters in Congress.210 Several broadcasters, fined heavily by 
the FCC for airing the expletives, argued that the FCC lacked an 
adequate basis for departing from its earlier standard and asked the 
Supreme Court to hold that the FCC’s new policy was arbitrary and 
capricious.211 The petitioners based their argument on State Farm, 
stressing that the Court in that case required a reasoned analysis for 
rescinding a rule promulgated under a previous administration and 
that the FCC had not done so for its policy change in the case at 
hand.212 
The Court rejected this argument, holding that the FCC’s 
departure from the established fleeting expletive policy was 
procedurally adequate.213 Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia 
interpreted the State Farm standard narrowly: 
[There is] no basis . . . for a requirement that all agency change be 
 
 208. See Becker, supra note 176, at 73 (“Although State Farm is the leading case on agency 
change of direction in rulemaking, the Court has analyzed regulatory revisions in several other 
cases without conclusively stating how persuasive an agency’s explanation of a change of course 
must be to survive judicial review.”). 
 209. FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1800, 1809–10 (2009). Although not a 
midnight rulemaking case, the Supreme Court’s recent interpretation of the State Farm 
arbitrary-and-capricious standard, id. at 1810–11, may signal a shift regarding what counts as a 
valid justification for changed agency positions. 
 210. Id. at 1810; see also id. at 1815–16 (plurality opinion) (“[T]he precise policy change at 
issue here was spurred by significant political pressure from Congress.”). Since 1975, the FCC’s 
policy had been that nonrepeated, or fleeting, expletives did not violate federal law banning the 
broadcast of indecent language. But in 2004, the FCC changed its policy so that even a single 
aired expletive could be actionably indecent. Id. at 1805, 1807 (majority opinion). For a 
discussion of how the FCC’s decision was the culmination of the Bush administration’s efforts to 
change aired indecency policy, see Albert W. Vanderlaan, Note, Sending a Message to the Other 
Branches: Why the Second and Third Circuits Properly Used the APA to Rule on Fleeting 
Expletives and How the New FCC Can Undo the Damage, 34 VT. L. REV. 447, 459–63 (2009). 
 211. Fox, 129 S. Ct. at 1807–08. 
 212. Id. at 1810. 
 213. Id. at 1819. 
CUENIN IN PRINTER PROOF 10/17/2010  10:28:22 PM 
486 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 60:453 
subjected to more searching review. The Act mentions no such 
heightened standard. . . . [State Farm] . . . said only that such action 
requires “a reasoned analysis for the change beyond that which may 
be required when an agency does not act in the first instance.”214 
Most importantly, the Court stressed that there is no difference in the 
scope of review “between initial agency action and subsequent agency 
action undoing or revising that action.”215 Under the Court’s 
reasoning, the burden on agencies to support a policy change is low, 
as an agency need only “display awareness that it is changing 
position” and “show that there are good reasons for the new 
policy.”216 The agency “need not demonstrate to a court’s satisfaction 
that the reasons for the new policy are better than the reasons for the 
old one.”217 Holding that “the Commission forthrightly acknowledged 
that its recent actions have broken new ground,” the Court 
determined that the FCC’s actions satisfied the threshold 
consciousness-of-change inquiry.218 The FCC also satisfied the second 
“good reason” prong because “[i]t is surely rational . . . to believe that 
a safe harbor for single words would likely lead to more widespread 
use of the offensive language.”219 Thus, the Court held that the FCC’s 
policy satisfied its reinterpreted State Farm arbitrary-and-capricious 
standard.220 
3. Implications for Midnight Rules.  Before Fox, scholars agreed 
that, under State Farm, an incoming president could not justify 
rescinding his predecessor’s midnight rules by citing differences in 
their respective policy platforms.221 Indeed, the notion that State Farm 
could burden a new president wishing to ratchet back the midnight 
regulations of his predecessor supported some of the earliest post–
State Farm commentary.222 Commentators also noted that, if 
 
 214. Id. at 1810 (quoting Motor Vehicles Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 
U.S. 29, 42 (1983) (emphasis added in original)). 
 215. Id. at 1811. 
 216. Id. 
 217. Id. Moreover, “the agency need not always provide a more detailed justification than 
what would suffice for a new policy created on a blank slate.” Id. 
 218. Id. at 1812. 
 219. Id. at 1812–13. 
 220. Id. at 1813–14. 
 221. See, e.g., Mendelson, supra note 5, at 593 (arguing that State Farm would significantly 
burden a new administration wishing to reverse policy from its predecessor, requiring “much 
more” in the record to justify policy changes after a transition). 
 222. See, e.g., Smythe, supra note 179, at 1934 (“[State Farm] suggests that the regulatory 
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challenged in court, a rule modified or rescinded after a presidential 
transition would have to be backed by evidence supporting the 
change.223 Lower court precedent on the issue was mixed,224 and 
scholars disagreed over exactly how much of a justification would 
suffice for a posttransition modification or rescission to survive 
arbitrary-and-capricious review.225 Still, State Farm stood in opposition 
to the political realities of modern presidential transitions—at least as 
far as midnight regulations were concerned.226 
These difficulties brought calls for reform. Because of State 
Farm’s obstacles, commentators suggested reducing the scrutiny for 
repealing or modifying the midnight regulations of an outgoing 
administration.227 These critics argued that the Supreme Court in State 
Farm misperceived presidential policy’s role in midnight regulation.228 
Professor Beermann, for example, posited that “[t]he problem of 
‘midnight regulations’ would be ameliorated if the standards for 
judicial review took greater account of pure political-type policy 
considerations.”229 
 
status quo that includes the unrescinded regulation is presumptively in accord with 
congressional policy, making changes in that status quo presumptively ultra vires . . . .”). 
 223. See, e.g., Becker, supra note 176, at 70, 97 (commenting on the necessity of an agency 
providing an explanation for its decision). 
 224. See id. at 97 (summarizing the mixed bag of lower court holdings applying the State 
Farm standard). 
 225. Compare Loring & Roth, supra note 9, at 1441–42 (describing the State Farm standard 
as a steep evidentiary barrier), with Becker, supra note 176, at 98 (“State Farm’s ‘reasoned 
analysis’ standard places an apparently light burden on an agency to explain a change of 
course.”). 
 226. See Beermann, supra note 135, at 361 (describing State Farm’s “difficulties” with 
respect to rescinding midnight regulations); Loring & Roth, supra note 9, at 1441–42 (arguing 
that State Farm prevents incoming presidents from acting upon midnight regulations); see also 
Kagan, supra note 154, at 2380–83 (arguing that State Farm’s arbitrary-and-capricious standard 
does not account for presidential political control of the regulatory process). 
 227. See, e.g., Beermann, supra note 135, at 362 (suggesting reevaluation of State Farm 
arbitrary-and-capricious review in the midnight rulemaking context to allow incoming 
administrations to reverse the previous administration’s late-term regulations); Loring & Roth, 
supra note 9, at 1460 (“[The Court should] either lower or eliminate the State Farm standard as 
it is applied to midnight regulations. This would make it easier for the incoming administration 
to repeal and amend an outgoing administration's midnight regulations, providing valuable 
oversight while avoiding the pitfall of bias.”). 
 228. See Beermann, supra note 134, at 1011 (“[S]tandards of judicial review . . . [should] take 
better account of the role that policy plays in the administrative process. Perhaps the [State 
Farm] Court was wrong in its choice of the prior regulatory regime as the baseline for evaluating 
new rules.”). 
 229. Id. at 1014. See generally Mendelson, supra note 5 (arguing that courts should 
acknowledge political motives). 
CUENIN IN PRINTER PROOF 10/17/2010  10:28:22 PM 
488 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 60:453 
Fox may have achieved this goal: even though Fox did not 
directly confront midnight regulation, its endorsement of a seemingly 
political motive for an agency reversing its position lends support to 
presidents wishing to undo midnight regulations. Whereas 
commentators thought State Farm meant that incoming presidents 
could not easily modify or rescind midnight regulations,230 the Fox 
Court implicitly repudiated the language in State Farm that had been 
read to require a heightened standard of review of an administration’s 
reasons for rescission or modification.231 In fact, the Court insisted 
that agencies would not have to explain why a new, modified, or 
rescinded rule was better than its predecessor.232 Although its full 
effect has not yet been realized, Fox apparently enables new 
presidents to undo midnight regulations left by their predecessors. 
For midnight regulations, this development may have broader 
implications for how courts view an incoming administration’s rule 
changes. First, courts will probably not scrutinize an incoming 
administration’s motives for changing an outgoing administration’s 
regulations that conflict with the new president’s policies. Second, the 
Court has signaled that posttransition regulatory change is not meant 
to be difficult to justify. More broadly, these considerations speak to 
the legitimacy of law change, even when politics are responsible for 
an agency’s change in position.233 By recognizing the legitimacy of 
political motives, Fox thus reflects a presidential-control viewpoint of 
the administrative state.234 As an exercise of presidential control, 
midnight rulemaking seems legitimate under Fox—as is undoing 
midnight rulemaking.235 These concerns dovetail with the motive 
inquiry courts make when deciding a vacatur-for-mootness question, 
and the following Part illustrates why a vacatur question should be 
answered affirmatively for changes to midnight regulations. 
 
 230. See supra note 179 and accompanying text. 
 231. See supra text accompanying notes 213–17. 
 232. FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1800, 1811 (2009). 
 233. See id. (“It suffices that the new policy is permissible under the statute, that there are 
good reasons for it, and that the agency believes it to be better.”). 
 234. See supra notes 154–55 and accompanying text; see also supra Part III.C.2. 
 235. For a discussion of incoming presidents’ motives for changing unfinished midnight 
rules, see supra notes 144–48 and accompanying text. 
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IV.  EVALUATING THE TENTH CIRCUIT’S APPROACH TO VACATUR 
AND MIDNIGHT REGULATIONS 
The Tenth Circuit’s vacatur analysis was correct, and courts 
should follow its approach in future cases when a contested midnight 
regulation is modified or rescinded pending appeal. Although the 
question is open under current Supreme Court precedent,236 vacatur is 
the appropriate remedy when a new administration’s rule moots a 
controversy over the outgoing administration’s midnight regulations. 
This discussion also illuminates the broader issues of midnight 
rulemaking and rule-change mootness. 
A.  Analysis under Current Doctrine 
Most importantly, a midnight rule’s posttransition rescission can 
be squared with existing Supreme Court precedent supporting 
vacatur. Such rescissions or modifications fit Munsingwear’s 
happenstance notion because the underlying reason for the rule 
change—a presidential power shift—is not attributable to the party-
agency even when that agency’s actions voluntarily mooted the 
case.237 Rather, agencies under new administrations change these 
unfinished rules midappeal, for example, because of policy 
differences or because they believe the midnight rules left for them 
are politically untenable.238 Midnight-regulation rescissions are readily 
distinguishable from situations like Cammermeyer because incoming 
administrations do not rescind midnight rules in response to the 
outcome of litigation, but rather because of the new administration’s 
beliefs about the rules themselves.239 These particular rule changes are 
further distinguishable from cases like Tafas because, although the 
government is responsible for mooting the case by changing the 
disputed rule, the new administration is more akin to a new litigant, 
dissatisfied with the rule left by its predecessor.240 
 
 236. E.g., Khodara Envtl., Inc. ex rel. Eagle Envtl. L.P. v. Beckman, 237 F.3d 186, 194–95 
(3d Cir. 2001) (noting that Supreme Court precedent has not established a categorical rule); see 
also supra Part II.B. 
 237. Cf. Nat’l Black Police Ass’n v. District of Columbia, 108 F.3d 346, 353 (D.C. Cir. 1997) 
(noting that after a rule change moots a case, “the executive branch is in a position akin to a 
party who finds its case mooted on appeal by ‘happenstance,’ rather than events within its 
control”). 
 238. See supra notes 144–47 and accompanying text. 
 239. Cf. Cammermeyer v. Perry, 97 F.3d 1235, 1239 (9th Cir. 1996) (denying vacatur because 
the government rescinded its rule after losing in court). 
 240. For a discussion of Tafas, see supra text accompanying notes 120–26. 
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These rule changes also dovetail with Bonner Mall because, 
although a new administration’s rescission of a midnight rule might 
count as a voluntary action, the incoming administration does not 
rescind a rule as an alternative to pursuing an appeal.241 A trickier 
question might arise when the president comes to power and settles 
with the litigants on the condition that the administration will begin a 
new rulemaking process.242 Vacatur would still likely be proper in this 
situation, however, if the settlement terms moot the case. Though the 
new administration’s response to the midnight regulation is 
technically a settlement and may thus appear to fall under Bonner 
Mall’s antivacatur presumption,243 the settlement stems from a belief 
by both parties that the underlying rule is defective or otherwise 
undesirable.244 That is, vacatur would be appropriate because the new 
administration would not be pursuing settlement to avoid appellate 
review. 
Moreover, Fox might answer whether a rule rescission in such a 
scenario should affect the vacatur outcome.245 Fundamentally, the 
doubts over whether to vacate turn on questioning the government’s 
motive for changing its rule.246 After Fox, though, the new 
administration needs only some justification for changing a rule, and 
the Court seems to acknowledge that politics can supply that 
reason.247 It is unclear how a court deciding a vacatur-for-mootness 
issue could justify conducting a more searching review of a new 
 
 241. For a discussion of how recent incoming administrations have automatically suspended, 
reversed, and revised an outgoing administration’s unfinished rules, see supra notes 166–67 and 
accompanying text. 
 242. See, e.g., Joint Motion, supra note 175, at 2 (describing the midlitigation settlement 
between the Obama administration and plaintiffs contesting the Bush administration’s trucker 
rules); see also RUSHING ET AL., supra note 6, at 6 (explaining that settlements can “effectively 
reverse” midnight rules); Rossi, supra note 163, at 1039–43 (discussing the implications of 
settlement for midnight rules). 
 243. See U.S. Bancorp Mortg. Co. v. Bonner Mall P’ship, 513 U.S. 18, 29 (1994) 
(“[M]ootness by reason of settlement does not justify vacatur of a judgment under review.”). 
 244. See supra notes 144–47, 165–72 and accompanying text; see also Bonner Mall, 513 U.S. 
at 29 (holding that although settlement generally bars vacatur, “[t]his is not to say that vacatur 
can never be granted when mootness is produced in that fashion”). 
 245. See, e.g., Khodara Envtl., Inc. ex rel. Eagle Envtl. L.P. v. Beckman, 237 F.3d 186, 194–
95 (3d Cir. 2001) (analyzing the Supreme Court’s decision in Munsingwear and its implications 
for a categorical rule); Nat’l Black Police Ass’n v. District of Columbia, 108 F.3d 346, 353 (D.C. 
Cir. 1997) (“[T]he Bancorp presumption against vacatur might apply if the case has been 
rendered moot on appeal by enactment or repeal of a regulation . . . .”). 
 246. See, e.g., Wyoming v. USDA (Wyoming II), 414 F.3d 1207, 1213 (10th Cir. 2005) 
(analyzing the motive for repealing the roadless rule). 
 247. See supra Part III.C.2–3. 
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administration’s decision to pull a disputed rule.248 Such an inquiry 
would have fit well in the State Farm era, when political reasons for 
rescinding rules posttransition were seen as insufficient to support a 
rescission.249 But that standard has fallen by the wayside.250 That 
posttransition rule changes are simply part of American political 
practice251 favors vacatur. Although this argument does not address 
whether vacatur is proper for all regulation changes resulting in 
mootness, it explains why changes to midnight rules should avoid 
scrutiny in the vacatur analysis. 
Ultimately, confusion surrounding vacatur for mootness caused 
by rule change stems from lower courts missing the rationale 
underlying Supreme Court precedent. Bonner Mall’s focus on which 
party mooted the dispute and subsequently requested vacatur has 
misled the lower courts to focus similarly on the causal party in rule-
change cases. For example, the Wyoming II court supported its 
decision to vacate by noting that although the USDA had lost in the 
district court and then changed its rule, interveners had appealed—
not the USDA.252 The Tafas court, however, denied vacatur because 
the USPTO was the party responsible for mooting the dispute.253 
Courts can hardly be faulted for attempting to follow Bonner 
Mall’s instruction, but Bonner Mall seems to miss the mark for 
midnight-rule-change cases. One way to view posttransition rule 
change is that even though the litigating parties might stay nominally 
identical, when an incoming administration moots the dispute by 
changing a rule, the party responsible for the mootness really has 
changed. That is, incoming and outgoing administrations are different 
entities under a presidential-control model of agencies.254 Fox 
supports this conceptualization, suggesting that presidential policy 
 
 248. See FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1800, 1810 (2009) (holding that 
there is no “requirement that all agency change be subjected to more searching review”); cf. 
Khodara, 237 F.3d at 195 (refusing to question a legislature’s motive for rescinding a rule that 
mooted the case). 
 249. See, e.g., Beermann, supra note 135, at 361–66 (describing the “difficulties” that State 
Farm created for rule rescissions following political transitions). 
 250. See supra notes 213–17 and accompanying text. 
 251. Jack, supra note 43, at 1482 (“[A]n incoming administration’s withdrawal and 
suspension of . . . [midnight] rules has become a familiar, if not inevitable, post-election 
phenomenon.”); see also Dudley, supra note 164, at 29 (“[M]idnight regulation is inevitable.”). 
 252. Wyoming v. USDA (Wyoming II), 414 F.3d 1207, 1213 (10th Cir. 2005). 
 253. Tafas v. Kappos, 586 F.3d 1369, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (en banc). 
 254. For a discussion of the presidential-control model, see supra notes 154–55 and 
accompanying text. 
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change can supply a nearly sufficient ground for agency position 
change.255 
A better approach to these vacatur decisions, however, might 
acknowledge that Bonner Mall represents a different category of case. 
Bonner Mall led to focus on which party caused the mootness for fear 
that losing parties would settle repeatedly to avoid bad precedent.256 
Though at least one court has expressed concern that agencies might 
change rules in response to unfavorable lower court decisions,257 the 
fear that agencies would routinely redeem from the Federal 
Supplement judgments against midnight rules seems misplaced under 
current doctrine. For example, civil litigants typically cannot assert 
nonmutual collateral estoppel against the government. and agencies 
can nonacquiesce in courts’ judgments.258 Agencies thus have less to 
lose through bad precedent than litigants generally. Regardless of 
what specific scenarios the Court has addressed in its vacatur 
opinions, the ultimate question in the vacatur analysis is whether the 
values served by vacatur outweigh those served by letting the 
judgment stand.259 Bonner Mall simply protects a different set of 
values than the ones at stake in litigation over an agency’s 
regulations. 
Indeed, vacatur for mootness caused by changes to midnight 
rules reflects an entirely different public value of judgments than does 
Bonner Mall: the public value of law change. Vacatur cases do not 
explicitly recognize this value, but support for it appears in the 
appellate decisions recognizing the appropriateness of vacatur when a 
legislative change moots the case.260 Khodara Environmental, Inc. ex 
rel. Eagle Environmental L.P. v. Beckman,261 for example, suggested 
 
 255. See FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1800, 1811 (2009) (requiring only 
that the agency be “aware[]” that it has changed position and give “good reasons” for doing so). 
 256. See supra text accompanying notes 97–101. 
 257. Nat’l Black Police Ass’n v. District of Columbia, 108 F.3d 346, 353 (D.C. Cir. 1997) 
(“[In] 19 Solid Waste Department Mechanics [v. City of Albuquerque, 76 F.3d 1132 (10th Cir. 
1996),] . . . Albuquerque admitted that it had adopted the new policy in response to the district 
court’s decision enjoining the existing policy as unconstitutional . . . .”). 
 258. See supra note 81 and accompanying text. 
 259. See, e.g., Cammermeyer v. Perry, 97 F.3d 1235, 1239 (9th Cir. 1996) (“[T]he decision to 
vacate is not to be made mechanically, but should be based on equitable considerations.” (citing 
U.S. Bancorp Mortg. Co. v. Bonner Mall P’ship, 513 U.S. 18, 24–25 (1994))). 
 260. See, e.g., Nat’l Black Police Ass’n, 108 F.3d at 351–54 (stating that vacatur should only 
be granted when it serves the public interest and acknowledging the presumed legitimacy of law 
change by legislative action). 
 261. Khodara Envtl., Inc. ex rel. Eagle Envtl., L.P. v. Beckman, 237 F.3d 186 (3d Cir. 2001). 
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the legislative change that had mooted the case was not manipulative, 
but instead represented “responsible lawmaking” that “could . . . be 
viewed as a commendable effort ‘to repair what may have been a 
constitutionally defective statute.’”262 The National Black Police Ass’n 
court similarly noted that “legislative actions are presumptively 
legitimate” and refused to impute a vacatur-precluding manipulative 
motive to the legislature responsible for the mootness in that case.263 
These concepts track the historical notion that the legislature is the 
supreme source of lawmaking power and cannot be prevented from 
changing the law.264 An analogous example of the reluctance to bind 
the government is the bar on using nonmutual collateral estoppel 
against the government.265 By allowing vacatur, courts have implicitly 
accepted the legitimacy of legislative change—even though those 
courts do so by analogizing the legislative action to happenstance so 
as to fit within Munsingwear’s vacatur paradigm.266 
Regulatory changes should be treated similarly. The public 
benefits from enabling agencies to change rules that those agencies no 
longer believe are in the public interest and from according agencies 
the same leeway as courts provide legislatures. The rub is that 
agencies, unlike legislatures, find themselves parties to cases 
invalidating rules. They are thus subject to Bonner Mall’s instruction 
against vacatur when the voluntary action of a party causes 
mootness.267 But courts presume the underlying action—a change in 
 
 262. Id. at 195 (quoting Am. Library Ass’n v. Barr, 956 F.2d 1178, 1187 (D.C. Cir. 1992)). 
 263. Nat’l Black Police Ass’n, 108 F.3d at 352. 
 264. See United States v. Winstar Corp., 518 U.S. 839, 872–73 (1996) (plurality opinion) 
(explaining the concept of legislative sovereignty and its English roots). But see id. at 873 
(“[A]lthough we have recognized that ‘a general law . . . may be repealed, amended or 
disregarded by the legislature which enacted it,’ and ‘is not binding upon any subsequent 
legislature,’ on this side of the Atlantic the principle has always lived in some tension with the 
constitutionally created potential for a legislature, under certain circumstances, to place 
effective limits on its successors, or to authorize executive action resulting in such a limitation.” 
(second alteration in original) (footnote omitted) (citation omitted) (quoting Manigault v. 
Springs, 199 U.S. 473, 487 (1905))). 
 265. See supra note 81 and accompanying text. 
 266. See, e.g., Nat’l Black Police Ass’n, 108 F.3d at 353 (suggesting that when legislative 
action moots a case, “the executive branch is in a position akin to a party who finds its case 
mooted on appeal by ‘happenstance,’ rather than events within its control”). 
 267. See, e.g., Tafas v. Kappos, 586 F.3d 1369, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (en banc) (“[I]t was the 
USPTO (the losing party in the district court action) that acted unilaterally to render the case 
moot, and vacatur is not appropriate.”); see also Cammermeyer v. Perry, 97 F.3d 1235, 1239 (9th 
Cir. 1996) (“'The principal condition to which we have looked is whether the party seeking 
relief from the judgment below caused the mootness by voluntary action.” (quoting U.S. 
Bancorp Mortg. Co. v. Bonner Mall P’ship, 513 U.S. 18, 24 (1994))). 
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the law—legitimate.268 Fox lends further support to the legitimacy of 
law change by agency action in suggesting that even a political 
reevaluation of the existing legal standard is a valid ground for agency 
position change.269 If this sort of agency change is legitimate, then rule 
changes that cause mootness merit the same presumption given to 
legislative changes. The focus of vacatur doctrine is equitable balance, 
and courts have acknowledged that the interest in encouraging 
legislative law change outweighs the value of preserving precedent. 
Courts should apply Munsingwear and Bonner Mall less mechanically 
and do the same for regulatory law change—regardless of whether a 
party-agency mooted the dispute. 
B.  Broader Implications 
Although midnight-rule-change mootness warrants vacatur 
under current doctrine, several questions remain unanswered. First, 
does the decision to vacate shed any light on the normative debate 
surrounding midnight regulation? Second, are midnight rules special, 
or does the propriety of vacatur for midnight-rule-change mootness 
inform how courts should consider vacatur for all rule changes? This 
Note does not answer these questions but introduces a framework for 
thinking about them. 
The first question implicates the ongoing dispute over whether 
midnight rulemaking—and undoing midnight rulemaking—is a 
legitimate exercise of presidential power.270 But questions concerning 
the propriety of midnight rulemaking are not part of vacatur doctrine. 
Although courts are aware of midnight rulemaking,271 vacatur 
doctrine directs courts to analyze the reason for mootness.272 An 
incoming administration changes a rule because it thinks its 
predecessor’s unfinished midnight rule is either procedurally invalid 
or at odds with its own policies.273 For the vacatur inquiry, either 
purpose suffices as a legitimate reason for changing rules. 
Whether to vacate when a midnight-rule dispute has been 
mooted is thus a question of what the incoming administration thinks 
 
 268. See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 263. 
 269. See supra text accompanying notes 233–35. 
 270. For a brief introduction to this debate, see supra notes 149–55 and accompanying text. 
 271. See supra notes 173–80 and accompanying text. 
 272. See supra text accompanying note 92. For an overview of cases addressing the vacatur 
for mootness doctrine, see supra Part II.B–C. 
 273. See supra notes 144–47 and accompanying text. 
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about midnight regulation. If midnight rulemaking were truly in the 
public’s best interest, a presumption against vacatur for mootness 
caused by postinauguration changes might be appropriate. Courts 
might discourage incoming administrations from changing unfinished 
midnight rules by denying vacatur, but that approach would 
contradict fifty years of vacatur-for-mootness doctrine.274 For 
example, courts routinely vacate when statutory changes moot 
litigation.275 Moreover, whether midnight regulation is objectively 
desirable is a State Farm–era question for courts to ask.276 Instead, 
what matters in the vacatur-for-mootness analysis is whether the 
incoming administration thinks midnight rulemaking is undesirable. 
On a broader level, midnight rulemaking is an accepted part of 
the contemporary political landscape. The public will likely expect the 
incoming president to attempt to undo midnight rules left by the 
outgoing administration. If unfinished rules conflict with the new 
president’s policies, the attempt to change the rules is not an 
improper purpose for the vacatur analysis. Whether midnight 
regulation is normatively desirable is a question for political scientists, 
not courts. Although observers often criticize midnight rulemaking as 
an illegitimate exercise of presidential power, this question does not 
matter in the vacatur-for-mootness analysis. Vacatur for mootness 
only requires courts to ask why the case became moot, and for 
postinauguration changes to midnight rules, that question has been 
answered. 
But the way courts analyze vacatur in midnight-rule-change cases 
might inform how observers should view midnight rulemaking 
generally. If a court acknowledges that an incoming president is 
changing an unfinished midnight rule because it was defectively 
promulgated, that court implicitly recognizes the rulemaking was not 
a legitimate exercise of administrative authority. A defectively 
promulgated rule is never legitimate. If, however, the court believes 
that a postinauguration change is legitimate and warrants vacatur, 
then the court implicitly acknowledges the rule change was a 
legitimate exercise of executive power—at least to the extent that the 
executive branch had no manipulative motive for changing the rule. 
 
 274. For an overview of the Supreme Court’s vacatur-for-mootness jurisprudence, see supra 
Part II.A–B. 
 275. See, e.g., supra notes 260–64 and accompanying text. 
 276. For further discussion of the shift in the justification for agency position change from 
State Farm scrutiny to Fox’s relaxed standard, see supra Part III.C. 
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But if it is legitimate for an incoming administration to change a 
midnight rule, it must also be legitimate for an outgoing 
administration to promulgate that rule. Indeed, this view accords with 
the model the Supreme Court seems to have adopted for evaluating 
the procedural legitimacy of agency position changes.277 Viewed 
through this lens, midnight rulemaking is a normal part of 
presidential transitions rather than a sinister political practice. 
The second question essentially asks why the vacatur calculus 
should focus on midnight rulemaking specifically. Indeed, courts have 
indicated the uncertainty in vacatur doctrine about rule-change 
mootness generally.278 Changes to midnight rules that moot disputes 
are an admittedly narrow subsection of these cases. Although this 
Note’s insights are not necessarily limited to vacatur for midnight-rule 
changes, there are several reasons to focus attention on them. 
Overall, the main focus in the vacatur analysis is the cause of the 
mootness. For rule changes, that inquiry turns on the legitimacy of 
the rule change: was it in response to a belief that the rule was 
inadequate or was it in response to unfavorable litigation?279 Surely 
more rule changes than those in response to unfinished midnight rules 
would fall into this first category. But midnight-rule changes have 
additional attributes that make them even less likely to be perceived 
as illegitimate. Midnight rules are characteristically rushed and 
susceptible to procedural defect,280 and today’s incoming presidents 
routinely change or at least suspend the midnight rules left by their 
predecessors.281 Both factors make midnight-rule changes that cause 
mootness more likely to warrant vacatur across the board. 
But if recognizing and protecting the public value of law change 
is vacatur’s core,282 differentiating midnight-rule changes from other 
rule changes is less important. Under this theory, courts would afford 
rule changes the same presumption of legitimacy as legislative 
changes,283 and courts would allow vacatur even when a party agency 
 
 277. See supra note 255 and accompanying text. 
 278. For discussion of the confusion among lower courts about the application of vacatur 
doctrine to rule-change mootness, see supra Part II.C. 
 279. See supra text accompanying notes 128–30; see also supra text accompanying note 92. 
 280. See supra note 190 and accompanying text. 
 281. For a discussion of action taken by incoming presidents in response to unfinished 
midnight regulations, see supra Part III.B. 
 282. See supra text accompanying notes 260–66. 
 283. See, e.g., Nat’l Black Police Ass’n v. District of Columbia, 108 F.3d 346, 352 (D.C. Cir. 
1997) (“[L]egislative actions are presumptively legitimate . . . .”). 
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changed its rule after an unfavorable ruling or agreed to issue a new 
rule as part of a settlement. This approach has not yet found much 
favor with courts,284 but this Note’s argument that rule changes serve a 
broader public interest than these courts suppose might guide future 
vacatur decisions. 
CONCLUSION 
Midnight rulemaking is an established attribute of modern 
presidential transitions. Outgoing administrations may rush to issue 
midnight rules largely for political reasons. The incoming 
administration has similar political motives for wanting to undo these 
midnight regulations. Indeed, every recent president has suspended 
his predecessor’s midnight regulations that had not gone into effect 
by inauguration day. Private litigants, though, are unlikely to wait for 
inauguration to challenge midnight regulations in court. This scenario 
raises the possibility of litigation being interrupted by a rule change 
that moots the case midappeal—the situation in Wyoming II. Case 
law on this question is ambiguous, however, and some precedent hints 
that vacatur is an improper remedy when an agency’s voluntary rule 
rescission or settlement moots the case pending appeal. 
The Tenth Circuit reached the correct result, though. Not only 
can mootness caused by changes to unfinished midnight rules be 
squared with existing vacatur doctrine, but broader public values 
support vacatur in ways that courts have yet to examine. Moreover, 
courts’ approaches to vacatur for changed midnight rules illuminate 
the broader discussion about the legitimacy of midnight rulemaking 
within the administrative state. Although these insights extend 
beyond midnight rulemaking, they at least favor reaching the same 
conclusion as the Wyoming II court. 
 
 284. See, e.g., Cammermeyer v. Perry, 97 F.3d 1235, 1239 (9th Cir. 1996) (noting that the fact 
that the defendant agency “rendered this case moot by conceding that Cammermeyer should be 
reinstated and by replacing the challenged regulation” counseled against vacatur); 19 Solid 
Waste Dep’t Mechs. v. City of Albuquerque, 76 F.3d 1142, 1244 (10th Cir. 1996) (denying 
vacatur because the defendant City of Albuquerque changed its rule in response to losing in the 
district court). 
